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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW: THE RETREAT FROM MIRANDA-
Harris v. New York (U.S. 1971).
With a decision handed down February 24, 1971, the Burger
Court may have begun the much anticipated roll-back of the pro-
cedural rights of the criminal accused. President Nixon's two recent
Court appointees joined with the three dissenters from Miranda v.
Arizona' in upholding the admissibility of an in-custody statement
which most authorities previously believed inadmissible. The dra-
matic change in the Court's attitude may affect the entire scope of
police methods of gathering evidence, including search and seizure,
wiretapping, eavesdropping, lineups, secret agents and custodial
interrogation. This note will consider a few of the decision's more
immediate implications: the effect on a defendant's fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination,2 the shift in the Court's atti-
tude towards the police, the application of the exclusionary rule to
real proof and "the fruit of the poisonous tree,"' and judicial faith
in the curative capacity of jury instructions.
In Harris v. New York 4 the Court held that the prosecution
may use a statement to impeach a defendant's credibility, even
though the same statement would be inadmissible in the case-in-
chief due to noncompliance with the procedural standards required
by Miranda v. Arizona.5 The statement's admissibility is subject
only to the legal standards of trustworthiness.
Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the majority opinion, in
which Justices Harlan, Stewart, White and Blackmun joined. Mr.
Justice Black dissented. Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined.
The police arrested Harris for twice selling heroin to an under-
cover agent. They interrogated him without advising him of his right
to appointed counsel-a clear violation of Miranda. Under question-
ing Harris admitted to selling the narcotics. At the trial, the
prosecution did not use his statements in its case-in-chief. However,
Harris took the stand and denied that he had sold heroin on the
second occasion, claiming that it was baking powder. The trial
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (dissenters were Harlan, White and Stewart).
2 U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
3 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
4 Harris v. New York, Cert. No. 206 (Feb. 24, 1971).
5 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (prior to questioning, a suspect must be notified
of his right to remain silent, that any statement made may be used against him and
that he has a right to the presence of retained or appointed counsel.)
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court permitted the introduction of the defendant's earlier state-
ments for the limited purpose of impeaching his credibility. The
court instructed the jury that the statements attributed to Harris
by the prosecution could be considered only in passing on his credi-
bility and not as evidence of guilt.
The Court held that "[t] he shield provided by Miranda cannot
be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free
from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."
The Court's opinion relied on a 1954 case, Walder v. United States.7
Walder held that a defendant's assertion on direct examination
that he had never possessed narcotics removed the bar to evidence
of heroin illegally seized in connection with an earlier proceeding
against him, provided the evidence was used only to attack his
credibility. The Walder opinion (and Justice Brennan's Harris
dissent) made much of the fact that the narcotics were used only
to attack the defendant's credibility on a collateral issue. Harris's
statement, on the other hand, concerned issues directly involving
his guilt. However, the Burger Court failed to discern any appre-
ciable difference in principle between Walder and Harris, thus killing
the collateral-direct distinction.
THE POST-MIRANDA TREND
A review of the post-Miranda pre-Harris lower court decisions
on the question decided in Harris reveals the magnitude of the
Supreme Court's recent change of direction. Legal scholars and
lower courts hitherto believed that Walder was no longer good law.
In United States v. Birrell, a federal district court concluded that
the current trend of constitutional developments vitiated the case's
rationale, and declined to follow it. The court there ruled that
"[t] he Government should be restricted to using untainted evidence
in the impeachment of witnesses ... 2"
On the more specific issue of whether Miranda had overruled
Walder, the consensus of opinion was almost unanimously in the
affirmative. The language of Miranda seemed to leave little doubt
that it excluded the use of illegally obtained confessions for any
purpose, including impeachment:
Statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are
often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate un-
truths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove
6 Harris v. New York, Cert. No. 206, 4 (Feb. 24, 1971).
7 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
8 276 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
9 Id. at 817.
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guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any mean-
ingful sense of the word and may not be used without full warnings
and effective waiver required for any other statement.10
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Harris, felt that "[t]his language
completely disposes of any distinction between statements used on
direct as opposed to cross-examination."" He noted that six United
States Courts of Appeal' and nearly every other court which had
considered the issue" agreed with him. The United States Court of
Appeal for the Second Circuit clearly summarized the general
feeling in United States v. Fox,1 4 and in the process held that
illegally-obtained statements may not be used for impeachment
purposes. The court recognized that the Miranda language quoted
above may be "technically dictum." However, the judge there ruled
that "[i] t is abundantly plain that the Court intended to lay down
a firm general rule with respect to statements unconstitutionally-
obtained. ....",,1
The Harris Court, however, saw no problem in dismissing the
plethora of inconsistent post-Miranda authority with no more than
three sentences. The majority opinion simply noted that discussion
of the impeachment issue was not essential to the Miranda holding.
This fact, in the Court's view, relegated any passing reflections on
the question to the status of mere dictum. Therefore "[i] t does not
follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused
in the prosecution's case-in-chief is barred for all purposes.
The ease with which the Harris opinion sweeps aside the
1o Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
11 Harris v. New York, Cert. No. 206, 6 (Feb. 24, 1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(See notes 11 and 12, infra).
12 United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Pinto,
394 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1968); Breedlove v. Beto, 404 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1969);
Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Wheeler v. United States,
382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
13 State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (1967) ; People v. Barry, 237
Cal. App. 2d 154 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967); Valarde v. People, 466
P.2d 919 (Colo. 1970) ; State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968) ; People v. Luna,
37 Ill. App. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967); Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App. 572,
252 A.2d 487 (1969); People v. Wilson, 20 Mich. App. 410, 174 N.W.2d 79 (1969);
State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960) ; State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86,
171 S.E.2d 398 (1970) ; Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968) ;
Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); Cardwell v. Commonwealth,
209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d
370 (1967). Justice Brennan found only three state appellate courts agreeing with
New York: State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J. Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970); State v.
Butler, 19 Ohio. St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); and State v. Grant, 459 P.2d
639 (Wash. 1969).
14 403 F.2d 97, 102 (2d. Cir. 1968).
15 Id. at 102.
16 Harris v. New York, Cert. No. 206, 2-3, (Feb. 24, 1971).
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undeniable logic and prolific authority of the post-Miranda cases
foreshadows a drastic shift in attitude towards the constitutional
rights of the accused.
THE POLICE
The decision manifests at least a partial softening of the Court's
so-called "mistrust" of the police. Law and order advocates saw
Escobedo v. Illinois7 and Miranda as symptomatic of the Warren
Court's misguided suspicion of the methods and motives of law
enforcement officers. One example of the consequences of that
trepidation was the strong feeling engendered in the post-Miranda
lower court decisions that lowering the standards for impeachment
admissibility would encourage flagitious interrogation tactics re-
pugnant to the Constitution. Judge Ely of the United States Court
of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit articulated this concern eloquently:
There is little doubt that the great majority of the law enforcement
officers of our Circuit strive to comply with the mandates of the Con-
stitution. At the same time, they are engaged in a continuing, frustrating
battle against lawlessness. If authorized to do so, they could not fairly
be criticized for conducting unconstitutional interrogations designed to
elicit possible impeachment evidence. 1 8
He further expressed the fear that lowering the standard of
impeachment admissibility would give rise to a two-step interroga-
tion procedure. Upon making an arrest, police would first illegally
question the suspect in hope of obtaining impeachment evidence.
They would then conduct an interrogation which conformed to the
Miranda standards, aimed at producing directly admissible evidence.
It is enlightening to note how little energy Chief Justice Burger
expended in dismissing the police misconduct question in Harris. He
emphasized the value of impeachment evidence in assessing the
defendant's credibility. Its advantages are not to be sacrificed, he
declared, "because of the speculative possibility that impermissible
police conduct will be encouraged thereby."'
9
This remark is more in tune with the views expressed by the
Miranda-Escobedo dissenters-White, Harlan, and Stewart. Justice
White, for example, severely criticized Escobedo as reflecting "a
deep-seated mistrust of law enforcement officers everywhere, un-
supported by relevant data or current material based upon our own
experience."2 Justice Harlan agreed: "Like my brother White, I
17 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
18 Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 180 (9th Cir. 1968).
19 Harris v. New York, Cert. No. 206, 3-4 (Feb. 24, 1971).
20 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 498-99 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
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think the rule announced today is most-ill-conceived and that it
seriously fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law-
enforcement."'" Escobedo also darkened Justice Stewart's skies:
"The Court says that what happened during this investigation 'af-
fected' the trial. I had always supposed that the whole purpose of a
police investigation of a murder was to 'affect' the trial. .. *"" The
day when the men in blue stop complaining about court decisions
which "handcuff" them may not be far off.
HARRIS AND THE HOBSON'S CHOICE
This decision seriously prejudices the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. Its practical effect is to give the police
good reason to procure confessions through illegal methods of inter-
rogation. Indeed, as Judge Ely points out in Groshart, "they could
not fairly be criticized for doing so. ' '23 Chief Justice Burger's
dismissal of the prospect as "speculative" ignores this simple fact.
And Justice White fails to grasp the very basic difference between
trusting the police and encouraging them to use illegal methods of
gathering evidence.
If the police can provide the prosecution with Harris type
evidence, they can put the defendant in a situation both tactically
precarious and inimical to his fifth amendment rights. He can refuse
to take the stand, in which case the illegal confession cannot be
admitted. If he chooses this course, however, he also foregoes the
right to testify in his own defense. Furthermore, the prosecution
can subtly call the jury's attention to his silence on the issue of his
own guilt.24 On the other hand, if the defendant does take the
stand, the prosecution can read the confession to the jury. All the
defendant is entitled to is a court instruction that the jury must
consider the confession only for purposes of determining his credi-
bility and not for purposes of deciding his guilt-a distinction which
a jury is highly unlikely to respect in light of an express admission
of guilt.25 In other words, the prosecution may now use illegally
obtained evidence to discourage the defendant from taking the
stand in his own defense.
21 Id. at 493 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 494 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
23 Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 180 (9th Cir. 1968).
24 E.g., the prosecution may point out that the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses remains uncontradicted. United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, 418 F.2d
1266 (2d Cir. 1969).
25 "We cannot take a drug for its salutary properties without receiving at least
a part of its poison." ANNOT., Note, 133 A.L.R. 1454, 1466 (1941), quoted in, Mc-
Cormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25
Tx. L. REV. 573, 580 (1947).
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THE DOUBLE STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY
The fact that Harris did not expressly overrule Miranda indi-
cates that a double standard of admissibility now applies to con-
fessions. Where the prosecution seeks to include a confession in
its case-in-chief, the procedures used to obtain it must pass the
Miranda test. On the other hand, when the state uses a confession
solely to attack a defendant's credibility, the Miranda standard
becomes irrelevant.
Harris hails an abrupt departure from the Warren Court's
approach to the rights of the accused. However, it is difficult to
believe that the Burger Court will endorse a return to the whippings
and marathon interrogation sessions condemned in Brown v. Missis-
sippi2" and Ashcraft v. TennesseeIT Therefore, the Court will prob-
ably apply some procedural standards in determining a confession's
admissibility even for impeachment purposes.
Miranda spells out the case-in-chief admissibility test. But
Harris leaves the development of an impeachment admissibility
standard to subsequent litigation. Chief Justice Burger redundantly
reiterates the "legal trustworthiness" requirement theoretically
applicable to any evidence. Other than that, the Court has left the
impeachment standard up in the air.
The Court will probably return to the last standard applied
before the Escobedo-Miranda revolution. This rule's swan-song
came in 1963 in Haynes v. Washington.28 The Court held there that
a confession is admissible unless it can be characterized as "in-
voluntary" in light of the "totality of circumstances" which pro-
duced it. Harlan, Stewart and White dissented from Escobedo, all
bewailing the demise of the totality-voluntariness standard. These
three members of the Harris majority probably favor its resurrec-
tion whenever possible.
Apparently, Chief Justice Burger agrees. In Harris, he analyzes
the circumstances surrounding the defendant's in-custody statement
very briefly, noting only the absence of a warning of the defendant's
right to appointed counsel and the "[p]etitioner makes no claim
that the statements made to the police were coerced or involuntary."29
The majority evidently felt that the absence of a claim of
coercion rendered further discussion unnecessary. Harris thus sug-
26 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (petitioner confessed as a result of a severe whipping.)
27 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (confession was obtained after 36 consecutive hours of
interrogation.)
28 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
29 Harris v. New York, Cert. No. 206, 2 (Feb. 24, 1971).
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gests a return to the "voluntariness" test for impeachment ad-
missibility.
REAL PROOF
Illegally seized real evidence clearly falls within the Walder-
Harris exception to the exclusionary rule. Walder directly involved
illegally seized physical evidence-narcotics. Harris cites it as con-
trolling. Therefore, the fact that physical evidence is tainted by an
illegal search and seizure does not bar its use for impeachment
purposes.
However, there is probably no double standard of admissibility
for real proof. In search and seizure cases, there are no degrees of
constitutional protection. Either probable cause was present or it
was not. Therefore, Harris indicates one admissibility standard for
real proof used in the case-in-chief and no standard at all for im-
peachment admissibility.
THE FRUIT OF THE POISONous TREE
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine was given its fullest
recent articulation by the Warren Court in Wong Sun v. United
States.0 The Court held that if a police investigation is based on
initial incriminating evidence that was illegally obtained, not only
is the evidence suppressed, but so is all other evidence that grew out
of, or was subsequently developed from, the original illegal evidence
by later police investigation.
Harris is a limitation on the exclusionary rule's application to
illegally obtained real proof and in-custody statements. Logically,
the decision would imply a limitation on that rule's application to
the fruit of the poisonous tree. In other words, the admissibility of
the fruit may depend on the purpose of the harvest.
A 1968 application of the Wong Sun rule would seem to imply
the contrary. In Harrison v. United States, 1 after three confessions
made by the petitioner were introduced at his trial, he took the stand
and testified to his own version of the facts, making damaging ad-
missions. When his conviction was reversed on the ground that the
confessions should have been excluded, the prosecution introduced
petitioner's former testimony at the new trial which resulted in a
conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, citing Justice Holmes to
the effect that the essence of an exclusionary rule is not just that
0 317 U.S. 471 (1963).
31 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
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certain evidence cannot be used in specific circumstances but rather
that ". . . it shall not be used at all.
' 3 2
After Harrison, it would seem that evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the fruit of the poisonous tree rule could not be used in any
way for any purpose. However, there was equal force before Harris
for the conclusion that Miranda excluded illegally obtained con-
fessions for any purpose. If Miranda falls, so may Harrison. There-
fore, the prosecution could also use for impeachment purposes evi-
dence resulting from leads suggested by Harris's confession. Such
evidence could be used against Harris or anyone else.
The prospects for such a limitation on Harrison loom larger
when the attitudes of the dissenters in that case are considered.
Justice White is typical. He complained that the holding resulted
from the Court's "fuzzy ideology" concerning confessions. He
found that ideology "difficult to relate to any provision of the Con-
stitution. . . ." Finally he noted that the Court's attitude excluded
... evidence of the highest relevance and probity. 3
There is thus every reason to believe that Harris implies a
similar limitation on the Wong Sun rule will soon follow, at least
with regard to confessions and real proof.
CURATIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Harris indicates a sudden and dramatic strengthening in the
Court's faith in the curative power of jury instructions. The Warren
Court seriously doubted a jury's capacity to disregard prejudicial
evidence. That skepticism towards the efficacy of judicial admoni-
tion was well expressed in Bruton v. United States.4 In that case,
the petitioner and a co-defendant were tried jointly for armed rob-
bery. The prosecution introduced the co-defendant's confession,
which clearly implicated the petitioner. The trial court instructed
the jury to disregard the confession for purposes of determining the
petitioner's guilt. The Court held that because of the substantial
risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to
the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining the peti-
tioner's guilt, admission of the confession violated his sixth amend-
ment right of cross-examination. Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, quoted Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United States:3 5
"The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
32 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968), quoting, Silverthorne Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
3 Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 228 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
34 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
35 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
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instructions to the jury.., all practicing lawyers know to be an un-
mitigated fiction." 36
Common sense reveals that it would be more difficult for a jury
to consider a defendant's confession only for purpose of impeaching
his credibility than to make the distinction required in Bruton. The
jury-instruction problem involved in Harris and the prior incon-
sistent statement exception to the hearsay rule raise precisely the
same issue. The traditional hearsay rule allows the introduction of
a witness's prior inconsistent statements solely for the purpose of
impeaching his credibility. This rule has been very much criticized
as requiring "mental gymnastics" from the jurors. The critics in-
clude Professor McCormick:
The only available sanction for our rule is an instruction that the jury
must not consider the prior statements of the witness as substantive
evidence on the main issue, but solely as bearing on the credibility of
the witness. Such an instruction, as seems to be generally agreed, is a
mere verbal ritual. The distinction is not one that most jurors would
understand. If they could understand it, it seems doubtful that they
would attempt to follow it.37
Interestingly enough, the Harris opinion did not even consider
the issue. The clear implication of Harris would be an overruling
of Bruton. Justice White's dissent in Bruton probably reflects the
Court's current attitude towards the curative capacity of jury in-
structions. He felt that "[r]esponsible judgement would be impos-
sible but for the ability of men to focus their attention wholly on
reliable and credible evidence .. ". . I He strongly resented the
implication that courts are more capable of making this judgment
than juries.
Thus, the clear implication of Harris is that a co-defendant's
confession may be introduced at a joint trial if the jury is properly
instructed.
CONCLUSION
This decision strongly suggests that the Court now values the
swiftness and certainty of criminal sanction above the sanctity of
constitutional rights. The days of Miranda may be numbered. Not
one member of the Harris majority favored it.
36 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968), quoting, Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 452 (1948).
87 McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 25 Tax. L. REv. 573 '(1947): The California legislature agreed with Profes-
sor McCormick on the futility of the distinction. See CAL. Ev. CODE § 1235 (West
1968).
38 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 142-43 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
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The Harris holding touches issues concerning the entire scope
of the rights of the accused. However, the four-page majority opin-
ion does not discuss any of them. The majority has kept us in the
dark about its feelings on police methods, the curative capacity of
jury instructions, the right against self-incrimination and all the
other questions the case raises. Perhaps the Court did not want to
"handcuff" itself with any in-depth analysis. For the moment, we
can only speculate that the Burger Court plans a rocky road for
the constitutional rights of the accused.
James R. Carroll
CRIMINAL LAW: FURTIVE MOVEMENT AND VEHICLE
SEARCHES-People v. Superior Court,
3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970).
On an early Sunday morning an officer of the California High-
way Patrol observed an automobile proceeding on an interstate
highway at an excessive rate of speed. When the officer signaled the
car to pull over, the driver immediately began to do so. At this point
the patrolman observed a "woman's head rise from the passenger
portion of the front seat; she turned and put her arm over the back
of the seat, then faced forward again, bent down toward the floor
and reassumed a normal sitting position."' The driver alighted from
the car and walked toward the officer. He produced his driver's
license and readily acknowledged that he had been speeding.
The officer then approached the passenger side of the car. The
officer made no attempt to communicate with the female passenger
but immediately opened the car door next to her and looked inside.
When questioned at the preliminary hearing, the officer stated he
had two reasons for acting as he did. "One was to talk to the pas-
senger and see what had been hidden and I was also concerned
about my own safety."2 When the officer opened the door he ob-
served what appeared to be marijuana lying on the floor mat. He
ordered the passenger out of the car and undertook a thorough
search of the car. He found additional small quantities of marijuana.
The defendants were charged by information with unlawful
possession' and transportation4 of marijuana. Their motion to sup-
1 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 811, 478 P.2d 449, 450 (1970).
2 Id.
3 CA,. H. & S. CODE § 11530 (West 1970): "Every person who possesses any
marijuana, except as otherwise provided by law, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the county jail ...not more than one year or the state prison ...not less than one
year or more than ten years."
4 Id. § 11531: "Every person who transports . any marijuana shall be
1971]
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press the evidence on the ground of illegal search and seizure was
granted, and the People sought review by writ of mandate.5 The
California Supreme Court concluded6 that the trial court was correct
in holding that the search was an unreasonable one within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment.
The supreme court held that a traffic offense, in itself, did not
justify a search of the automobile for contraband or weapons. The
court also held that the rule disallowing a search based merely on
an individual's "furtive movement" has been honored more in the
breach than in the observance. 7 Accordingly, the court noted that
appellate courts have been quick to find probable cause to arrest or
search for contraband based upon what the officer regards as a
"furtive movement" when "reflective analysis" of the facts and
circumstances surrounding this movement would disclose less than
probable cause to make an arrest or search. The court also found
that the facts did not justify a reasonable belief that the passenger
was armed. Consequently, a search for weapons was not justified.
The following is a discussion of the court's rationale. Particu-
lar emphasis is placed on the relationship that "furtive movement"
plays in the establishment of probable cause to search a car for
contraband. The writer will then examine the appellate court cases
in this area, analyzing their holdings in light of People v. Superior
Court" and other recent California Supreme Court cases dealing
with "furtive movement." This analysis will demonstrate that when
the defendant's actions are as consistent with innocent conduct as
they are with criminal conduct, those actions cannot be used to
establish probable cause to arrest or search as incident to that
arrest.
RATIONALE
An officer has probable cause to arrest a motorist when the
motorist commits a traffic violation in his presence.' ° The mere
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for . . . five years to life and shall
not be eligible for release . . . or on parole . . . until he has been imprisoned for
a period of not less than three years in the state prison."
5 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5(o) (West 1970): "Within 30 days after a defendant's
motion is granted at a special hearing in the Superior Court, the people may file
a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition, seeking appellate review of the ruling
regarding the search or seizure motion."
6 6-1 with Justice McComb dissenting without opinion.
7 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 478 P.2d 449, 455 (1970).
8 Id.
9 There are three classifications of vehicular violations proscribed by the Vehicle
[Vol. I11
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fact that there is an "arrest," however, is not sufficient to allow a
warrantless search of the vehicle as incident to that arrest." The
court in the present case noted that this rule has more often been
stated than explained, and, therefore, the court proceeded with a
thorough analysis of the reasons for the rule. The court examined
the traditional reasons for justifying a warrantless 12 search in-
cident to an arrest and concluded that none of these reasons were
applicable either to traffic arrests in general or to the present case
in particular.
The court stated that a warrantless search, limited both as to
time' 8 and place,' 4 may be made:
1. for instrumentalities used to commit the crime, the fruits of that
crime and other evidence thereof which will aid in the apprehension
or conviction of the criminal;
2. for articles the possession of which is itself unlawful, such as con-
traband or goods known to be stolen;
3. for weapons which can be used to assault the arresting officer or to
effect an escape.' 5
Instrumentalities, Fruits and Other Evidence
The court quickly dismissed the first category as not justifying
a search of an automobile. Since the offense was speeding and
since the instrumentality for this offense was the automobile itself,
the court concluded that a search of the car's interior was not
Code: 1) Infractions; 2) Misdemeanors; 3) Felonies. CAL. VEH. CODE § 40000 (West
1970).
10 Id. § 2409; CAL. PEN. CODE § 836(1) (West 1970).
11 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 812, 478 P.2d 449, 451 (1970);
People v. Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 116, 293 P.2d 57, 58 (1956) ; People v. Weitzer,
269 Cal. App. 2d 274, 290, 75 Cal. Rptr. 318, 328 (1969): "[S]earch of a vehicle
will not be warranted where it has no relation to a traffic charge for which the defen-
dant has been apprehended."
12 It was stipulated at the suppression hearing that the officer did not have a
warrant to search defendants' car; therefore the burden to show proper justification
fell upon the prosecution. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665 (1968).
13 Citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). "Once an accused
is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a war-
rant, is simply not incident to the arrest."
14 Citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
15 The court citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967). Other
exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant, aside from searches incident to an
arrest, are where there is danger of "imminent destruction, removal, or concealment
of the property intended to be seized or where the evidence is in plain sight, which
is in fact, no search for evidence." People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 56-7, 61, 442 P.2d
665, 668, 671 (1968).
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justified.16 The court also stated that there are no fruits17 of the
speeding offense and, consequently, no search was allowed on that
basis. Moreover, since the officer initially arrested the driver for
speeding committed in his presence, the evidence, the court said,
was not subject to search or seizure18 because the evidence is solely
the arresting officer's own observations and records.19
Weapons Used to Assault or Escape
A search for weapons is another instance where a warrantless
search incident to a traffic arrest may be made. This limited search,
however, can only be made under certain conditions. While mindful
of the dangers faced by traffic officers in approaching even minor
offenders, the court in the present case would not authorize a search
for weapons on the basis of a traffic arrest alone. The court required
a showing of additional facts or circumstances giving rise to a
reasonable belief that the traffic offender might be armed.20
16 The court cited Grundstrom v. Beto, 273 F. Supp., 912, 916 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
[operating a motor vehicle with a loud muffler] where the federal court stated:
"[tihe search of the interior of a motor vehicle bears no relation to seeking the means
by which a traffic offense was committed."
17 The court stated that the "vast majority" of traffic offenses, "moving" as well
as "equipment" would follow this analysis. People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807,
813 n.2, 478 P.2d 449, 451 n.2 (1970). However, driving under the influence of alcohol
or a narcotic would allow the police officer to conduct a reasonable search of the car
for corroborating evidence. People v. Robinson, 62 Cal. 2d 889, 894, 402 P.2d 834,
837 (1965). CAL. VEH. CODE § 23102 (West 1970).
18 This note does not purport to survey the law relating to searches and seizures
performed a significant time after arrest, which searches are conducted for contraband,
for evidence of a crime or for an inventory of the arrestee's effects. Some authorities
that deal with this problem: Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970)
and authorities cited therein; People v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 226, 430 P.2d 30 (1967) ;
People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 424 P.2d 342 (1967); People v. Andrews, 6 Cal. App.
3d 439, 85 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1970) ; Virgil v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 127,
73 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1968). Chambers eliminates any effect Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969) may have had on this area of search and seizure. The car was im-
pounded to secure it against removal. This lack of mobility eliminates the usual
rationale for warrantless searches of cars. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Nor was the car impounded on the basis of a state law requirement. Cooper v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). The issue was strictly the propriety of obtaining a search
warrant. The majority concluded it was not necessary. Harlan thought it was. The
search conducted in Chambers might be classified as a "continuation of the search
lawfully begun at the time and place of arrest." People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 126,
424 P.2d 342, 355 (1967). While the facts are not clear in Chambers as to when the
trench coat, answering the description given by the victim, was seized from the car
it appears it was taken at the time of arrest, hence the initial search from which the
continuation occurred. For the view that Chimel, supra, should play a part see
17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 626, 648 (1970).
19 Citing United States v. Tate, 209 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D. Del. 1962). See also
CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 2409, 22352 (West 1970).
20 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 829, 478 P.2d 449, 463 (1970). See
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
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The court concluded that the record disclosed no facts which
would reasonably warrant a search for weapons. The driver took
no evasive action. He immediately pulled over as directed. No
crimes were reported in the area. There was no prior information
on the defendants. The driver was cooperative. The court also
concluded that if the action of the passenger in bending down and
the driver's action in walking to the officer was not sufficient for
the officer to believe there was contraband in the car,2 ' then neither
would those actions reasonably justify a belief that the automobile
carried weapons.
The court also noted that, if the officer was still concerned for
his safety, he could have taken more reasonable steps to allay this
fear than to instigate a search. He could have asked the passenger
to roll down her window; or explain her movement; or show what
she might have in her hands; or ask her to step out of the vehicle.2
Furthermore, the court felt that while the officer stated he was
concerned for his safety, his actions belied that assertion. When he
approached the passenger side of the car and proceeded to search
it, the officer turned his back on the driver. The court concluded
that the search was exploratory and, consequently, the search was
not authorized by the fourth amendment.
Contraband
Scope of Search. The court met a more difficult question when
analyzing the search for contraband incident to an arrest. The
court asked why a police officer is entitled to conduct a search for
contraband incident to any arrest made except a traffic arrest.28
The court stated that the answer comes from the fourth amendment
itself.24 "The [fourth] amendment does not proscribe 'warrantless
searches' but instead it proscribes 'unreasonable searches.' 125 In
addition, "a search may be unreasonable and, hence, unlawful al-
though incident to a lawful arrest."2 The court also stated, "[t]he
21 The court stated that if the officer cannot reasonably expect to find contraband
upon a traffic violation he cannot expect to find weapons without other facts. People
v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 829, 478 P.2d 449, 464 (1970). As to the discussion
of contraband see note 32 and accompanying text infra.
22 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 830, 478 P.2d 440, 464 (1970).
23 Id. at 813, 478 P.2d at 451.
24 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... "
"An automobile has the status of a house, so far as the protection of the fourth
amendment is concerned subject to certain limitations arising from its mobility."
United States v. Greer, 297 F. Supp. 1265, 1267-68 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
25 The court citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 772-3 (1969) (White
dissenting).
26 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 813, 478 P.2d 440, 452 (1970)
citing People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 643, 290 P.2d 528, 530 (1955).
1971]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
principal evil sought to be forestalled ... is the invasion of in-
dividual privacy by wholesale exploratory searches conducted under
color of governmental authority. '2 7 Therefore, "the scope of the
search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible."28
The court held that these rules apply to searches of automobiles.
Since in a routine traffic case the arresting officer "cannot reason-
ably expect to discover either instrumentalities or fruits or seizable
evidence of the offense; 29 still less does the arrest give him reason-
able grounds to believe, without more, that the vehicle contains
contraband."30 The court laid down the following rule: no matter
how persuasive the probable cause to arrest a traffic offender is,
there must exist independent probable cause to believe the vehicle
contains contraband before it can be searched.8'
Probable Cause. What does this independent probable cause
consist of? Probable cause consists of facts and circumstances
within the officer's knowledge or about which he has reasonably
trustworthy information that are sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband was being
transported in the automobile which the officer stopped and
searched."2 "Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be
searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless
search of a residence or office." 8 However, this rule "merely re-
laxed the requirements for a warrant on grounds of practicality. It
did not dispense with the need for probable cause ' 34 that the car
was carrying contraband. "The validity of an arrest is not neces-
sarily determinative of the right to search a car if there is probable
cause to make the search."3 5 Usually, however, in the typical traffic
violation case, the circumstances and facts known to a police officer
27 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 813-14, 478 P.2d 449, 452 (1970).
28 Id. at 814, 478 P.2d at 452 citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
29 See notes 16-18 and accompanying text, supra.
30 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 814, 478 P.2d 449, 452-53 (1970).
31 Id. at 815, 478 P.2d at 453 (emphasis added).
32 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). This fulfills the purpose of
the fourth amendment to protect individual privacy against indiscriminate govern-
mental intrusions. "[T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public
highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is
known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that
their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise."
33 Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968) following the
rule laid down in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
34 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
35 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. -, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 n.6 (1970). "[Tlhe
search of an automobile proceeds on a theory wholly different from that justifying
the search incident to an arrest." Id. at -, 90 S. Ct. at 1980.
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that give him probable cause to arrest the driver for another crime,
also give the officer probable cause to search the automobile.
Facts and circumstances the officer can use to establish prob-
able cause to search can come from information directed to the
police in the form of police broadcasts. While the court in the present
case did not discuss it, a police officer may detain a motorist upon
information received through "official channels."8 6 If an arrest is
made subsequent to detention, the source of the officer's informa-
tion must be based on facts sufficient to establish probable cause.17
In the present case the officer had no prior information that the de-
fendant's car contained contraband. Such information would be
rare in a routine traffic offense, said the court. This is because the
officer stops the automobile on account of the manner in which it
was driven or its condition and not because of the motorist's
identity.
The second source of probable cause to search a car for con-
traband is based on the officer's observations.88 The most reliable
observation is one of contraband in plain view within the auto-
mobile. 9 In the present case, the marijuana discovered by the
patrolman was not visible from the outside and did not come within
view until he opened the door next to the passenger. The question
then arises 40 whether it was reasonable for the officer to search
by opening the door.
Furtive Movement. The answer to this question turns on
whether the officer's observations of the occupant's actions estab-
lished probable cause to believe contraband was present in the
automobile. These actions are characterized as so called "furtive
movements." "The theory ... is that although the officer does not
actually see any contraband from outside the vehicle, he may rea-
86 Restani v, Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 3d 189, 195, 91 Cal. Rptr. 429, 432
(1970). "[Elven though there are no unusual or suspicious circumstances warranting
detention by the detaining officer he may, nevertheless, detain a person for investiga-
tion or questioning upon the basis of information received through 'official chan-
nels.'"
87 Id. at 196, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
86 Court citing Grundstrom v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 912, 917 (N.D. Tex. 1967):
"A search for contraband is reasonable when conducted incident to a traffic violation
only when the arresting officer observes some occurrence other than the traffic offense
itself which reasonably leads the officer to believe that the motorist possesses contra-
band .... " (emphasis added by the court in People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807,
816, 478 P.2d 449, 454 (1970)).
89 Observations of things in plain sight where the policeman has a lawful right
to be there to observe is not a "search." The objects may be seized without a search
warrant. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665 (1968).
40 Since the officer had to open the car door to observe the marijuana, which
he could not see from outside the car, he conducted a search. Cf. People v. Samaniego,
263 Cal. App. 2d 804, 69 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1968).
1971]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
sonably infer from the timing and direction of the occupant's move-
ments that the latter is in fact in possession of contraband which
he is endeavoring to hide."'" The court said that the theory rests on
a sound psychological basis as seen from the viewpoint of the
actor."2 Upon a sudden confrontation it is a natural impulse to hide
contraband.43 It appears from the court's discussion, however, that
probable cause cannot be based on a speculation as to defendant's
motives. Psychology plays no part. Because of the many plausible,
yet conflicting, interpretations that can be advanced to explain a
"furtive movement," the movement is ambiguous in meaning. It
would require a subjective analysis to attach any meaning to the
movement. Yet the establishment of probable cause requires facts
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge. Subjective specu-
lation as to the motives for a furtive act is not a "fact or circum-
stance" within the knowledge of the officer. It is a conclusion
without an adequate foundation in fact. Because of this conflict in
interpretation, the law requires more than a mere "furtive gesture"
to constitute probable cause to search or arrest.
44
Other Facts. In reviewing the cases in this area, the court felt
that this rule had not always been followed by appellate courts.
The appellate courts have been quick to find other facts to impart
a guilty connotation to the defendant's "furtive act." However, the
supreme court, by its decision in People v. Superior Court,
45 will
require "reflective analysis" of these facts in order to determine
whether probable cause exists to arrest or search. However, the
writer submits that if any one of these facts is equally susceptible
to innocent as well as guilty interpretation, it should carry no
weight in the establishment of probable cause. These facts should
neither add to nor subtract from the determination of probable
cause.
People v. Superior Court48 proceeded to give examples of cases
where so called "furtive acts," by the defendant, are more con-
sistent with guilt than with innocence. Those cases justified a find-
ing of probable cause for arrest based upon the observance of a
41 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 817, 478 P.2d 449, 454 (1970).
42 Id. at 817, 478 P.2d at 454-55.
48 Citing People v. Jiminez, 143 Cal. App. 2d 671, 674, 300 P.2d 68, 70 (1956).
44 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 478 P.2d 449, 455 (1970) citing
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-7 (1968) where the Supreme Court said:
".. . deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law
officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on
the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper
factors to be considered on the decision to make an arrest." (Italics added by the
California Supreme Court).




"furtive gesture" combined with one of the following: 1) prior
reliable information; or 2) the officer's own observation of contra-
band; or 3) a deliberate act of concealment under otherwise sus-
picious circumstances.4 7
People v. Sanson.48 The court questioned some appellate court
cases in which the evidence "assertedly giving sinister meaning to
the 'furtive gesture' has been so thin as to stretch [the chain of
inferences derived from the evidence] almost to the breaking
point."49 The supreme court then discussed People v. Sanson5° as
exemplifying a case wherein the appellate court did not engage in
"reflective analysis" of the facts. In this case the defendant was
observed driving his car "very slowly" at 3 a.m.; there was no
license plate illumination and the taillight was blue instead of red.
When the officer turned on his red emergency light to notify the
defendant to stop, the officer observed the passenger appear "to be
hiding something under the front seat."'" After the passenger left
the car, the officer looked under the seat to see what was placed
there. He found a dirty paper bag which he opened and saw con-
tained marijuana. The court of appeal held that there was no
error in admitting the evidence after challenge by the defendants.
47 People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9, 21-22, 429 P.2d 177, 185 (1967) [observed
suspect in the act of deliberately hiding a package or box which, under the circum-
stances, created probable cause to believe it contains. contraband]; People v. Superior
Court, 272 Cal. App. 2d 383, 387, 77 Cal. Rptr. 646, 649 (1969) [car stopped for
driving without lights, defendant bent forward and officers saw him push a small
white box under the front seat]; People v. Mosco, 214 Cal. App. 2d 581, 585-86, 29
Cal. Rptr. 644, 647 (1963) [downward motion of an occupant of a parked car, fol-
lowed by officer's observation of a marijuana cigarette under the seat]; People v.
Jiminez, 143 Cal. App. 2d 671, 673, 300 P.2d 68, 70 (1956) [downward motion of
a juvenile sitting with others in a car parked in an area where officers had been told
to expect a gang fight].
48 156 Cal. App. 2d 250, 319 P.2d 422 (1957).
49 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 820, 478 P.2d 449, 457 (1970).
50 156 Cal. App. 2d 250, 319 P.2d 422 (1957).
51 Most appellate court cases on furtive movement invariably cite People v.
Blodgett, 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956). For instance, Sanson stated that the facts
were "strikingly similar to those in Blodgett." The supreme court in People v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970) however, said the analogy was untenable.
In Blodgett, defendant was seated with two companions in a taxicab, doubled-parked
in front of a hotel, late at night. The police approached the cab to investigate. When
they ordered the occupants out, one of the officers saw defendant withdraw his left
hand from behind the seat at the juncture of the seat and back cushion. The supreme
court in People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 819 n.5, 478 P.2d 449, 456 n.5 said
Blodgett was a close case and should be limited on its facts and not extended. The
crucial fact in Blodgett would seem to be the observation of defendant's hand actually
being withdrawn from the seat and cushion juncture. Cf. People v. Moray, 222 Cal.
App. 2d 743, 35 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1963). Most furtive acts as seen by the officer'con-
sist of the movement of an arm, shoulder, head or other large area of the body that has




People v. Superior Court52 noted that the Sanson court im-
properly speculated on defendant's motives for his act. The court of
appeal and the arresting officer did not have any "knowledge of
what the defendants 'realized,' were 'conscious' of, or 'feared,' or
what 'impulse' they felt.""3 "Probable cause cannot be based on a
belated interpretation of the suspect's conduct which appears rea-
sonable only in light of evidence uncovered in that very search."
54
The court also concluded that Sanson violated the rule that
"probable cause to arrest or to search must be tested by 'facts
which the record shows were known to the officers at the time the
arrest [or search] was made.' "' Assuming that the only facts
known to a police officer, besides the traffic offense, are that the
driver or other occupant suddenly "leans forward" or "bends
down" or otherwise reaches toward the dashboard or floor, is that
sufficient probable cause to believe the car contains contraband?
The court repeated that it is not. They said there were too many
weak links in the officer's chain of deductions, in interpreting a
"furtive movement," to support a finding of probable cause. The
court then analyzed these deductions based on the two assumptions
the policeman might make.
Innocent Behavior. The first assumption the officer might
make is that the movements were purposeful, i.e., intentional, re-
sponses to the officer's appearance on the scene. However, the
court noted that: 1) The defendant may not have seen the police
car, therefore, the movement would be irrelevant; 2) If he did, he
may not have recognized the police car since many confrontations
occur at night; 3) If he did recognize the car for what it was, he
may not have understood that the police were attempting to bring
his car to a halt; 4) If he knew that the police were attempting to
stop his car, his movements might not have been made in response
thereto; he may have been on the verge of making them anyway;
5) Even if his movements were in response to the situation, they
may not have been purposeful. The "furtive movement" may have
been an understandable nervousness manifested by random, undi-
rected gestures or movements.5




56 People v. Weitzer, 269 Cal. App. 2d 274, 292, 75 Cal. Rptr. 318, 330 (1969) as
quoted in People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 817-18, 478 P.2d 449, 455 (1970).
Cf. People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 683, 446 P.2d 800, 806 (1968): "To hold that
police officers should in the proper discharge of their duties detain and question all
persons . . . who act nervous at the approach of officers would for practical purposes
involve an abrogation of the rule requiring substantial circumstances to justify the
detention and questioning of persons on the street." If acting nervous at the sight of
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The second assumption that might be made by the police
officer is that only the guilty will react in the described manner to
a policeman's signal to stop. Again the court excepted, saying: 1)
The policeman will likely ask to see his driver's license and regis-
tration card. The movement might have been a manifestation of
an effort to reach for his wallet or for her handbag, or for the glove
compartment in order to obtain the license or registration card;
2) Every driver knows the policeman will want to speak to him,
therefore, preparation for this may have been made: rolling down
the window; leaning forward to turn the radio off; extinguishing a
cigarette; laying down food or beverage; 3) The driver may want
to alight from the car or expect to upon demand. Therefore, prepa-
ration for this might have been made: unbuckling seat belts;
removing maps or packages from his lap; adjusting his clothing;
4) He may have applied his parking brake which in some cars is
below the dashboard. Therefore, he would have leaned forward or
downward to apply it.
5 7
All of the above generalized gestures are innocent. However,
from the officer's viewpoint, they may be taken as indicating the
hiding of contraband.5" Thus, they are susceptible to innocent as
well as guilty interpretations. Therefore, furtive gestures do not
establish probable cause to search or arrest. The court also stated
that the addition of other "facts" does not necessarily impart a
guilty connotation to the "furtive gesture." Nighttime is an exam-
ple. The fact that "it is night when the police appear is not 'conduct'
of the motorist 'in response to' the officer's signal .... [I]t does
not, without more, transform an innocent gesture into a culpable
one furnishing probable cause to search."59
Another fact that does not necessarily impart a guilty connota-
tion to a "furtive gesture" is alighting from the car to greet the
policeman. The court could conceive of a desire by the defendant
to appear helpful in order to ingratiate himself with the policeman.
An additional fact is "erratic driving." It could be evidence of
alcoholic or narcotic intoxication. It could also be caused by the
appearance of the police.60 The court cited other appellate cases
police does not justify detention then it is obvious it will not justify arrest. Compare
with People v. Martinez, 6 Cal. App. 3d 373, 86 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1970).
57 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 821-23, 478 P.2d 449, 458-59 (1970).
58 The court states the officer's limited opportunity to observe such gestures should
be borne in mind. "He views them not only from outside the suspect's car but also
1) from one car to another while both are moving; 2) at a time when a traffic offense
has been committed, the vehicles are maneuvering to the side of the road, and the
officer will properly be concerned for his own safety and that of others, and 3) most
commonly in the nighttime . . . ." Id. at 823 n.9, 478 P.2d at 459.
59 Id. at 825, 478 P.2d at 461.
60 The court cited People v. Goodrick, 11 Cal. App. 3d 216, 89 Cal. Rptr. 866
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on point. The court did not, however, examine the additional facts
that appellate courts have used to justify a search. The court did
note, however, that some are less persuasive than others.61 In an
attempt to fashion a rule for searches, some of these cases will be
analyzed in juxtaposition to People v. Superior Court 2 and other
recent California Supreme Court cases. This rule will reflect an
attempt to delineate the minimum requirements to establish prob-
able cause to search for hidden contraband.
EXAMINATION OF APPELLATE COURT CASES
Delay in Stopping
The court in People v. Superior Court3 said, that of the
various circumstances stressed in the appellate cases to impart guilt
to a furtive movement, perhaps the most persuasive is a driver's
failure to stop his car promptly when an officer signals him to stop.
However, this fact is subject to various interpretations. The failure
to stop promptly may have been caused by road conditions, speed
of the vehicles or traffic congestion. An attorney would be well
advised to examine in detail the circumstances surrounding this
delay in stopping. Some examples will illustrate this situation.
In People v. One 1958 Chevrolet Impala64 the defendant made
several sharp turns and maneuvers with his car after the police
gave chase to stop him for driving his car without its headlights
on. When defendant's car finally stopped, it blocked the officer's
ability to proceed. The driver looked at the officers and then toward
the floorboard. His right arm and shoulder went downward toward
the floorboard. The officer alighted and met the defendant who had
also alighted. Thereupon, the officer opened the partly ajar door
of defendant's car. Protruding from under the front seat, the officer
saw a brown paper bag which he later discovered contained mari-
juana. The court of appeal held that there was sufficient probable
cause to make the search. As we have seen, a "furtive gesture"
alone will not justify probable cause to search. Alighting from a car,
to meet the policeman, will not add guilty connotations to the
(1970) where the court of appeal attached sinister meanings to the driver's actions in
bringing her car to a halt after the police observed a "furtive movement." The Califor-
nia Supreme Court could find plausible the defendant's explanation that the police
car's spotlight blinded her. Goodrick is also subject to criticism of an improper specula-
tion into defendant's motives. See text accompanying note 52, supra. See also text
accompanying note 75, infra.
61 See the discussion of these cases in the text accompanying note 63, infra.
62 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970).
63 Id.
64 219 Cal. App. 2d 18, 33 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1963).
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furtive movement.65 Therefore, in order to establish that there was
probable cause to believe defendant's car contained contraband, it
must be determined if the defendant's evasive maneuvers in addi-
tion to his furtive movement can indicate guilt. A man of ordinary
care and prudence would view an apparent attempt to evade the
police as support for the assumption that the defendant's act in
bending down upon seeing the police was a guilty act-a deliberate
attempt to hide contraband. The act was undertaken after the de-
fendant saw the police. While not a strong case, it would seem that
a search based on these facts would be reasonable.
Another case that emphasizes the delay in stopping is Bergeron
v. Superior Court.6 In this case, defendant was observed traveling
at an excessive speed. The police followed and directed the de-
fendant to pull over. He pulled over into the next lane and traveled
approximately one-quarter of a mile before he yielded to the right
and stopped. While traveling this distance, the police officer noticed
the defendant's right arm go to the area of his face and his right
shoulder go down four or five inches. The officer also noticed lateral
body movements of five or six inches.6 7 The police officer thought,
that because of these body movements and the delay in stopping,
the defendant might have concealed an alcoholic beverage. The
officer thereupon searched under the defendant's car seat and
found marijuana. The appellate court did not disturb the trial
court's finding of reasonable cause for the search. The appellate
court noted that the weight to be given the testimony as to the
unreasonableness in the delay in stopping was for the trial court.
This case is highly objectionable in light of People v. Superior
Court.8 Inherent in this case is the conflict between the trial
court's determination of facts and the appellate court's review of
those facts. However, based on Superior Court it would seem that
as a matter of law there was no probable cause to search. 9 The
only fact used to establish probable cause, other than furtive move-
ment, was the delay in stopping. The arrest report indicated that
the traffic was light to moderate. The defendant only traveled one-
quarter of a mile, and at freeway speeds, this is not a very long
distance. This delay is susceptible to innocent as well as guilty
motives. The defendant may have found it difficult to pull over.
65 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970).
66 2 Cal. App. 3d 433, 82 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1969).
67 As to the ability of the officer to perceive such limited movements see note 58,
supra.
68 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970).
69 See also Remers v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 664, 470 P.2d 11, 13 (1970):
"An arrest and search based on events as consistent with innocent activity as with
criminal activity is unlawful."
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Closer examination of the circumstances surrounacng the delay
should be required.
Erratic or Dangerous Driving
People v. Shapiro70 is a case that combines an asserted "delay"
in stopping with "erratic driving." In this case, the defendant was
driving her car at night with its taillight out. The police followed to
arrest her. They turned on their emergency red light, sounded the
horn several times and then flashed their large auxiliary spotlight
across the back of the defendant's car. She traveled at most two
blocks. Prior to stopping, she leaned over in the seat so far that
her head went out of the officer's view. She testified that she had
dropped a cigarette she had been smoking and bent down to pick it
up. While making this movement her car turned in toward the curb,
hitting it with the front tire of her car. The appellate court attached
significance to the fact that the "furtive movement" was made al-
most immediately upon realizing she was confronted by the police.
The court cited People v. Jiminez7' for the proposition that
it is a natural impulse upon confrontation to hide immediately any
contraband. The court in Shapiro said that the police could reason-
ably infer that the defendant was exercising this "natural impulse."
However, this carries no weight in determining probable cause to
search for contraband. 72 A subjective speculation into the defen-
dant's motives is not allowed to establish probable cause.7 1
The Shapiro court also mentioned the defendant's delay in
stopping. However, there was nothing to indicate that her delay in
stopping was unreasonable. She traveled, at most, only two blocks.
She might not have noticed the police at first. The "delay" did not
enable her to hide anything. If she was going to use the "delay" to
hide contraband, she would have made a "furtive movement" dur-
ing the delay. Yet, the "furtive movement" was made just prior to
stopping. Also, defendant's manner of driving would not have im-
puted criminality to her "furtive movement." Contrary to what the
supreme court intimates in People v. Superior Court74 there was
not any "erratic or dangerous driving" in Shapiro. The mere act of
hitting the curb upon stopping, without more, cannot be classified
as erratic or dangerous driving. Many drivers have hit a curb upon
parking or stopping.
70 213 Cal. App. 2d 618, 28 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1963).
71 143 Cal. App. 2d 671, 300 P.2d 68 (1956).
72 See text accompanying note 41, supra.
73 See text accompanying note 52, supra.
74 3 Cal. 3d 807, 826, 478 P.2d 449, 461 (1970).
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People v. Goodrick75 is another example of so called "erratic or
dangerous driving." In this case, the defendant was stopped at
night for driving with only one headlight in operation. The driver,
defendant, was observed by the policeman to have leaned forward
to the right. As she did this, her right front wheel jumped the curb
and the car came to rest. The policeman testified he thought she
was concealing something. The defendant testified that she was
turning the radio off. In addition, she said that when she bent down,
the spotlight from the police car blinded her, causing her to run
over the curb. She was asked for her driver's license which she did
not have. The police then asked her and her passenger to get out
of the car. One of the officers searched under the front seat and
found seconal tablets.
The court in Goodrick held that the officers had probable
cause to search. The court said that the defendant's "furtive move-
ment" coupled with the manner in which she operated the vehicle
generated reasonable suspicion that she: 1) was either under the
influence of alcohol or narcotics; or 2) was unfamiliar with the
operation of a stolen vehicle; or 3) had a preoccupation with an
urgent need to hide contraband. The Goodrick court cited People
v. Blodgett76 and People v. Sanson77 as precedents for establishing
probable cause to search for contraband upon seeing a furtive
movement. However, People v. Superior Court7s in effect overruled
Sanson and limited Blodgett to its facts. Therefore, a speculation
as to the defendant's reasons in making a "furtive movement,"
without more, is insufficient probable cause. Furthermore, the de-
fendant's act of hitting the curb with her front wheel is not sufficient
to impart guilty significance to a "furtive movement." It is equally
susceptible to innocent as well as guilty motives. This is evident
from the defendant's testimony that she was blinded by the police
car's lights.
Since "probable cause cannot be based on a belated inter-
pretation of the suspect's conduct which appears reasonable only
in light of evidence uncovered in that very search, 79 it would
seem to follow that the defendant's testimony as to her reasons for
acting as she did cannot be used to establish that the policeman's
interpretation of her act was unreasonable. Yet, this dichotomy
seems compelled by our system of government. The police are re-
quired to justify a warrantless search. The fourth amendment is
75 11 Cal. App. 3d 216, 89 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1970).
76 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956).
77 156 Cal. App. 2d 250, 319 P.2d 422 (1957).
78 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970).
79 Id. at 821, 478 P.2d at 457.
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directed toward them, not the people. Furthermore, the defendant's
testimony is not of the same magnitude as an intrusion by the police
and, hence, the rule applied to the police should not apply to the
people. In addition, the defendant's testimony only shows that
there are other equally plausible and wholly innocent motives for
her act in hitting the curb."°
Belief the Car is Stolen
The court in Goodrick, however, further held that the defen-
dant's "furtive movement" and manner in which she drove the car
coupled with her lack of a driver's license gave the police reasonable
cause to believe that the car she was driving was stolen. However,
the defendant testified that she was driving her grandmother's car.
This testimony is relevant in showing that the police should have
countered her assertion by running a check on the car to see if it
was stolen, or ask to see the registration card. A missing registra-
tion card or an inconsistency between the name on the card and
the name of the driver would bear a relation to the possibility that
the car was stolen. However, the lack of a driver's license has no
such relation to that possibility."'
Recognition of the Defendant
A case decided after People v. Superior Court 2 is In re
Marshall K.88 In this case, the defendant was driving a car without
any illumination over the license plate. A police car followed. When
the officer directed the defendant to pull over, the officer saw a
passenger look back toward him and then turn back toward the
front. The passenger then bent over and "wriggled" his shoulders
and raised up. He then put his right hand on the top of the sun
visor and pulled it down part way. After this he pushed it back up
and then removed his hand. The officer thought the passenger was
hiding a weapon, alcohol or contraband. When the officer ap-
proached the car he immediately recognized the passenger as some-
one he had seen before. The officer had also heard that the passenger
was a suspect in narcotic activities.8 4 The officer then recognized the
80 See note 69, supra.
81 For an appropriate illustration of facts and circumstances that justify prob-
able cause to believe a car is stolen see People v. Ceccone, 260 Cal. App. 2d 886, 67
Cal. Rptr. 499 (1968) where the police stopped defendant, he had no operator's
license, nor proof of registration, gave conflicting statements as to ownership of the
car, and he was unable to describe the identity or whereabouts of recent companions
from whom he claimed to have borrowed the car.
82 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970).
83 14 Cal. App. 3d 94, 92 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970) rev'd on other grounds.




defendant's name upon inspecting his driver's license. This recog-
nition was a product of seeing two written statements naming the
defendant as allegedly being involved in narcotics.8 5 The state-
ments were given by third parties who were charged with possession
of marijuana. The officer then questioned the occupants of the car
about the sun visor. They denied that anyone had touched it. The
officer then pulled down the sun visor and found marijuana. The
court held that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
car contained contraband in view of the facts that he saw a "furtive
movement," he had recognized the defendant's name as a person
named in narcotics involvement, the denial of any movement to-
ward the sun visor, and the fact that the car could be driven away
before a search warrant could be obtained.
The question then arises: At what point in the confrontation did
the officer have probable cause to search the car for contraband?
Was probable cause established when the officer saw the movements
of the passenger? If not, did the prior information possessed by the
officer impart guilt to these movements, thereby giving probable
cause to search? Finally, assuming there was no prior information
possessed by the officer about the defendant, did his denial about
the sun visor impart guilt to the movements? As we have seen,
generalized furtive movements will not establish probable cause to
search. However, there are certain types of specific furtive move-
ments that will. In People v. Blodgett8" the police saw the defen-
dant withdraw his hand, after a confrontation with the police, from
the juncture of the back seat cushion. It was reasonable to conclude
that the defendant was hiding contraband. Criminality is attached
to this act because it is exercised when the defendant knows the
police are present and sticking a hand between the seats is not a
normal action. People v. Doherty87 is similar. The police observed
the suspect deliberately hide a package or box. People v. Superior
Court,"8 an appellate court case, is another example of a specific
furtive movement. The defendant bent forward and the officers saw
him push a small white box under the front seat. All of these acts
are specific instances of "hiding" versus general body movements
which are susceptible to many interpretations.
In Marshall K,89 the officer saw one of the defendants pull
down the visor and push it back up after noticing the police. This
act is too generalized to generate, by itself, probable cause to believe
85 Id.
86 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956).
87 67 Cal. 2d 9, 429 P.2d 177 (1967).
88 272 Cal. App. 2d 383, 77 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1969).




contraband was present. It is not uncommon to operate a sun visor.
Cigarettes, sun glasses and other innocent items can be placed there.
Similarly contraband can be hidden above a sun visor. Because of
the fact that operating a sun visor is as consistent with innocent
behavior as it is with criminal conduct, it cannot establish probable
cause to search.90
However, when the occupants of the car denied that anyone
had operated the sun visor, this denial transformed an otherwise in-
nocent act into one more closely associated with criminality. If the
act of operating the sun visor was innocent there would have been
no need to deny it. While the case is close, it would seem that to a
reasonable man probable cause to search has been established.91
When the fact that the police officer had reliable information
implicating the defendants in previous narcotics dealings is added,
the defendant's movement which was susceptible, initially, to in-
nocent interpretation has now become more susceptible to a criminal
connotation. This is because it is reasonable to interpret the pas-
senger's act in operating the visor as an act of hiding contraband.
The passenger had been previously connected with narcotics deal-
ings. In addition, he made the movement after observing the police.
Therefore, there was probable cause to search the vehicle.
THE RULE
It appears from the above92 that the following rules should be
used to determine if there is probable cause to search for contra-
band in a car upon observing a "furtive movement":
90 See note 69, supra.
91 Compare Gallik v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 548, - Cal. Rptr. -
(1971) (2-1) where the petitioner denied that he had placed anything under his car
seat. The denial coupled with a furtive movement gave probable cause for the police-
man to search the car. This denial differs greatly from that in In re Marshall K, 14
Cal. App. 3d 94, 92 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970) rev'd on other grounds. In Marshall the
occupants denied that anyone had made a furtive movement toward the sun visor.
Whereas in Gallik, the defendant did not deny that he had made a movement but
he did deny that he had placed anything under his seat. If the rule in Gallik is allowed
to stand it will vitiate the import of People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478
P.2d 449 (1970). Based on Gallik, the policeman only has to ask the suspect what he
placed under the seat and the response will establish probable cause to search. If
the suspect answers "nothing" as in Gallik, the officer can disbelieve him and search
under the seat lawfully. Asking the suspect the question, "what did you hide under
the seat," raises the fear that it could be used by the police as a subterfuge to
legitimize a search based on a mere hunch. See note 99, infra. In addition, an answer
consistent with innocence should not transform an otherwise ambiguous maneuver
into one evincing criminality. See note 69, supra. Therefore, as Justice Molinari states
in dissent: ". . . probable cause for the officer's search for . .. contraband . . . in
traffic violation cases must be predicated on specific facts and circumstances, other
than a mere negative reply to the subject inquiry, which gave reasonable grounds
to believe that contraband .. . [is] present in the vehicle the officer has stopped."
Gallik v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 548, 556, - Cal. Rptr. - (1971).
92 Another fact often mentioned by appellate courts as imparting guilty signifi-
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1) If the movement is as consistent with innocent activity as
it is with criminal conduct, an arrest and search based on this
movement is illegal.
a) Similarly, neutral facts such as nighttime and rural
area do not add to the establishment of probable cause.
2) There will, however, be other facts that will transform this
innocent looking movement into one more consistent with guilt. This
is when there is a deliberate act of concealment under suspicious
circumstances. People v. Blodgett 8 suggests the minimum require-
ments.
a) The policeman must see the defendant appear to hide
something. This is established by seeing the defendant's hand
enter or leave an area not normally associated with such move-
ment. It also may be established by seeing the defendant
actually hide a box or other container.
b) The second requirement is that the officer must know
or have a reasonable belief that the defendant is aware of the
policeman's presence. This is required in order to be reason-
ably certain that the defendant's act was purposeful, i.e., the
defendant acted because of the presence of the police.
This test meets the objection raised by People v. Superior
Court 4 as to the weak links in the officer's chain of deductions in
interpreting a "furtive movement." The officer must not merely see
a generalized random gesture made by the defendant with his
shoulders, arms or other large body area. He must observe a specific
act of concealment. Furthermore, the gesture must be made when
the defendant knows the police are present. Only then will the de-
fendant's act not be subject to ambiguous interpretations.
The test in interpreting a furtive movement must not be so
burdensome as to completely hinder the police in effective law en-
forcement. The fourth amendment only proscribes unreasonable
searches and seizures. Because the rule requires the policeman to
cance to a "furtive movement" is the place where the traffic offense took place. For
an example, see People v. Brown, 272 Cal. App. 2d 448, 77 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1969). In
this case the traffic offense took place in a rural area. However, the area where a
traffic violation took place should not add to the evaluation of a "furtive movement"
in determining probable cause to search. "Rural area" is like "nighttime." It is not
" 'conduct' of the motorist 'in response to' the officer's" presence. Therefore, it should
not "transform an innocent gesture (movement of the driver) into a culpable one
furnishing probable cause to search." See People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807,
825, 478 P.2d 449, 461 (1970). See also Cunha v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 352, 357,
466 P.2d 704, 707 (1970): "Neither petitioner's activities nor the location of his
arrest provided probable cause for arrest."
93 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956).
94 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970).
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see an act of hiding coupled with reasonable belief by the policeman
that the defendant knows of the officer's presence the rule, it is sub-
mitted, is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
It has been established from the foregoing that whenever a
trial court could reasonably conceive of equally innocent reasons for
the suspect's conduct, probable cause to arrest or search for contra-
band does not arise unless there are other suspiciou facts to tip
the balance. 5 These include not only the suspect's "furtive move-
ment" but also other facts that the courts of appeal have used to
impart guilty significance to this movement.96 The California Su-
preme Court by its decision in People v. Superior Court97 and other
recent cases" in the area of search and seizure will require the
policeman to point to specific facts and circumstances justifying the
defendant's arrest and search. The policeman cannot speculate as to
the defendant's motives. The requirement that the officer point to
specific facts and circumstances justifying his search will eliminate
any criticism that the officer uses "furtive movement" as a subter-
fuge to conduct a search on a mere "hunch."9 While "circumstances
and conduct which would not excite the suspicion of the man on
the street might be highly significant to an officer who had had
extensive training and experience in the devious and cunning devices
95 See note 69, supra. Cf. People v. Guy, 145 Cal. App. 2d 481, 487, 302 P.2d
657, 662 (1956): "[T]he term, probable, [as used in the term probable cause], means
having more evidence for than against; supported by evidence which inclines the
mind to believe, but leaves some room for doubt" (emphasis added).
96 "The near-insufficiency of the evidence of probable cause upheld in certain
[decisions of the courts of appeal] suggests that ... guilty significance has been
claimed for gestures or surrounding circumstances that were equally or more likely
to be wholly innocent." People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 827, 478 P.2d 449,
462 (1970) (emphasis added).
97 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 (1970).
98 Remers v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 P.2d 11 (1970); Cunha v.
Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 352, 466 P.2d 704 (1970); People v. Collins, 1 Cal. 3d
658, 463 P.2d 403 (1970).
99 The court cited a study made that would give credence to this fear. In
Marijuana Laws: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los
Angeles County, 15 U.C.LA. L. REv. 1499, 1533-35 (1968) the authors found that
the arrest reports were almost uniformly tailored with phrases of "furtive movement"
or "furtive gesture." The officers appear to be aware that if they tailor the arrest
report as above the judge will almost invariably accept it as sufficient probable cause.
This establishes "write in" probable cause. "The nagging question ...is whether
the police are truly interested in the conduct justifying the investigation or whether
they are using that conduct merely as an excuse for investigating some other activity
for which they have no legal basis. To the extent that the police use these procedures
as a subterfuge to uncover marijuana use, they have effectively created a new
'method' of marijuana enforcement." Id. at 1533. "That method, manifestly is un-
constitutional." People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 827-28 n.13, 478 P.2d 449,
463 n.13 (1970).
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used by narcotics offenders to conceal their crimes,"'100 the court
will not countenance abuses of that experience. There must be a
good faith compliance with the Constitution: "the police officers
should remember there is no substitute for patient and thorough
investigation, and should avoid drawing a hasty preconceived con-
clusion that the movements he observes are prompted by guilty
motives."' 0 ' The trial court should make an independent judgment
based on common sense and in light of all the facts at the time of
the event.
Finally, the appellate courts should not approach search and
seizure cases in a dogmatic manner. They must be aware that a
person's conduct may be a product of innocent as well as guilty
motives. The courts should not strain to find guilty motives. It is un-
derstandable that a court would tend to find guilty motives for the
defendant's act more plausible than innocent ones; but "probable
cause cannot be based on a belated interpretation of the suspect's
conduct which appears reasonable only in the light of evidence un-
covered in that very search."'12 The courts must analyze the facts
in a "reflective manner" in order to "forestall any encroachment"
of the fourth amendment's "fundamental guarantees." Only then
will the people be secure in their persons and effects.
Carl W. Holm
PARENT AND CHILD: MINOR'S RIGHT TO CONSENT TO
AN ABORTION: Ballard v. Anderson, 12 Cal. App. 3d 846, 90
Cal. Rptr. 468 (1970).
The term "abortion" recently has become a household word.
What was once criminal is now often legal and acceptable. Con-
comitant with the introduction and implementation of any new
law or laws, however, there arise a number of legal questions which
never before needed answering.
One of the questions posed by a reading of the Therapeutic
Abortion Act of 1967,' as interpreted in the light of prior legislation
100 People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 827, 478 P.2d 449, 463 (1970).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 821, 478 P.2d at 457.
1 "A holder of the physician's and surgeon's certificate, as defined in the Business
and Professions Code, is authorized to perform an abortion or aid or assist or attempt
an abortion, only if each of the following requirements is met:
(a) The abortion takes place in a hospital which is accredited by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
19711
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
regarding medical care for minors, is: Can an unmarried, uneman-
cipated female minor who is pregnant have her baby if her parents
demand that she have an abortion? Any attempt to establish legal
grounds upon which such a minor can withhold consent to an un-
wanted, parent-imposed abortion demands an in-depth study of the
instances in which minors can give legal consent to medical care.
A recent California case, Ballard v. Anderson,2 holds that a preg-
nant minor who is living at home cannot procure a therapeutic abor-
tion without parental consent. This note is primarily concerned with
the implications of Ballard.
MINOR'S RIGHT TO CONSENT
It is a generally accepted principle of law that medical services
rendered to a minor must first be consented to by his parents.' The
California Legislature, however, has acknowledged that exceptions
to this rule exist, and has enacted several statutes which allow
minors to submit to medical care without parental consent. Any
male, 18 years of age or over, may consent to give blood.4 Another
statute provides that any lawfully married minor may consent to
any medical care during the marriage as well as after the marriage,
should it fail by annulment or divorce.5 Any minor in the armed
forces may also consent to hospital or medical care. 6 Still another
section of the Civil Code allows a minor with any infectious, con-
tagious or communicable disease to consent to medical care related
to it.7 Similarly, parental consent is apparently never required in an
emergency situation where the life of the minor is endangered.'
In 1968 California's lawmakers enacted section 34.6 of the
(b) The abortion is approved in advance by a committee of the medical staff
of the hospital, which committee is established and maintained in accordance with
standards promulgated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. In any
case in which the committee of the medical staff consists of no more than three
licensed physicians and surgeons, the unanimous consent of all committee members
shall be required in order to approve the abortion.
(c) The Committee of the Medical Staff finds that one or more of the following
conditions exist:
(1) There is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely
impair the physical or mental health of the mother; (2) The pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest." CAL. H. & S. CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1970).
2 Ballard v. Anderson, 12 Cal. App. 3d 846, 90 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1970).
8 See Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d. 520 (1953) (dictum). See gen-
erally Comment, Medical Care and the Independent Minor, 10 SANTA CLARA LAWYER
334 (1970).
4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.5 (West Supp. 1970).
5 Id. § 25.6.
6 Id. § 25.7.
7 Id. § 34.7.
8 Hagman, The Medical Patient's Right to Know: Report On a Medical-Legal-
Ethical Empirical Study, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rsv. 758, 795 (1970).
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California Civil Code enabling minor children 15 years of age or
older, who are living apart from their parents, and managing their
own financial affairs to give their consent to any medical care. Since
parental consent is not required for emancipated minors to secure
medical care, strict interpretation of section 34.6 necessarily means
that parental consent is required for unemancipated minors.
A probe into the collective intent and motivation underlying
any legislature's actions is oft-times both a dangerous and tenuous
ground upon which to base a legal argument. Any such attempt
will usually be countered by the argument that if the legislature
had intended that a particular statute be interpreted in a certain
way, it would have said so in the wording of the statute. The very
existence of statutes giving a minor power to consent to certain
types of medical treatment indicates that the legislature thought it
unwise to forbid medical treatment without parental consent in these
situations, and that the best interests of the child were served by
allowing him to consent in these given instances. Review of the above
statutes, however, does little towards answering the question of
whether or not an unemancipated, unmarried pregnant minor may
have her baby if her parents demand that she have an abortion.
The existing statutory law merely evidences a general intent of the
legislature in specific instances.
PREGNANCY-RELATED CARE
Further investigation, however, reveals section 34.5 of the Civil
Code which allows any unmarried pregnant minor to consent to
the furnishing of medical treatment related to her pregnancy."0 This
9 "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a minor 15 years of age or older
who is living separate and apart from his parents or legal guardian, whether with or
without the consent of a parent or guardian and regardless of the duration of such
separate residence, and who is managing his own financial affairs, regardless of the
source of his income, may give consent to hospital care or any X-ray examination,
anesthetic, or medical or surgical diagnosis or treatment to be rendered by a physician
and surgeon licensed under the provisions of the State Medical Practice Act, or to
hospital care or any X-ray examination, anesthetic, dental or surgical diagnosis or
treatment to be rendered by a dentist licensed under the provisions of the Dental
Practice Act. Such consent shall not be subject to disaffirmance because of minority.
'The consent of the parent, parents or legal guardian of such minor shall not be
necessary in order to authorize such hospital, medical, dental, or surgical care and
such parent, parents or legal guardian shall not be liable for any care rendered pur-
suant to this section.
'A physician and surgeon or dentist may, with or without the consent of the minor
patient, advise the parents, parent or legal guardian of such minor of the treatment
given or needed if the physician and surgeon or dentist has reason to know, on the
basis of information given him by the minor, the whereabouts of the parents, parent
or legal guardian." CAL. Civ. CODE § 34.6 (West Supp. 1970).
10 "Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, an unmarried, pregnant
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section specifically provides that parental consent is not required
to authorize such care,11 and it appears to allow a minor to bear her
child to term without fear of interference from either the state or
her parents. Prior to this statute, a pregnant, unmarried minor had
ample reason to fear that she would not receive adequate pregnancy-
related medical care. Few doctors would aid her while knowing that
they might be sued by her parents. Further, doctors who aided a
minor in such a situation bore the added worry that payment for
their services might never materialize, as they knew that a minor's
contracts for such services could be disaffirmed. 2 One of the legis-
lature's obvious intents in the enactment of section 34.5 was to
eliminate these understandable fears of the minor, as well as to
set aside the medical world's justifiable apprehensions. The clarity
and specificity of this statute seemingly provide for effortless inter-
pretation of its intended meaning. Its purpose appears to be to safe-
guard the health and welfare of all pregnant, minor, unmarried
females by allowing them to consent to any medical services which
are related to their pregnancies. Since parental consent is not now
required when a minor seeks pregnancy-related care, refusal of the
parents to give their consent to such care will clearly have no effect.
The legislature apparently felt that without section 34.5, competent
medical care might be denied these children for reasons such as a
minor's right to disaffirm contracts,'3 or lack of the requisite paren-
tal consent. 4 The lawmakers were merely codifying the inherent
duty of the state to provide for the health and welfare of its citizens,
and a minor is indeed a citizen of the state. 5 The law demands that
the state take a continuing interest in the welfare of children within
its borders,' 6 and the state unquestionably holds both the power
and the duty to care for its young.'
An interpretation of the state's obligation to provide for the
health and welfare of its citizens presents a serious conflict: Does
the interest of the state in providing for the health and welfare of
its pregnant unmarried minors prevail over the state's interests in
minor may give consent to the furnishing of hospital, medical and surgical care related
to her pregnancy, and such consent shall not be subject to disaffirmance because of
minority. The consent of the parent or parents of an unmarried, pregnant minor shall
not be necessary in order to authorize hospital, medical and surgical care related to
her pregnancy. Id. § 34.5 (West 1954).
11 Id.
12 Id. § 35.
18 Id.
'4 Farber v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 509, 254 P.2d 520, 525 (1953).
15 See 32 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 46, 47 (1958).
16 In re Adoption of Bird, 183 Cal. App. 2d. 140, 148, 6 Cal. Rptr. 675, 680
(1960).
17 Matter of Guardianship of Michels, 170 Cal. 339, 149 P. 587 (1915).
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providing similar protection for the unborn child of that minor?
The risks of childbirth, though admittedly small, are definitely
present.' 8 A woman has a right to life. Due to the risk to her life
inherent in childbirth, she has the right to choose whether to bear
children. 9 This right to choose gives a woman the added right to
an abortion in many cases.20 Reason and logic, then, give rise to
the assumption that a primary intent of section 34.5 is to protect
the mother. Such an intention clearly places protection of the life
of the unborn child on a secondary level of importance.
The Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1967 further cements this
assumption, since it allows a legal abortion where continuance of
the pregnancy would result in substantial risk to the mental or
physical health of the mother.21 With regard to abortion, the intent
of the law is clearly to place the mental and physical health of the
mother on a higher level than the health and welfare of the unborn
child.
It would seem, then, that a pregnant, unmarried, unemancipated
minor could consent to an abortion if section 34.5 of the Civil Code
was reasonably construed in connection with section 25951 of the
Therapeutic Abortion Act. However, in a recent California case, the
Court of Appeals held differently. 2
MINOR'S CONSENT TO ABORTION
In the case of Ballard v. Anderson21 the court in essence stated
that abortion was not related to pregnancy, and that an unemanci-
pated minor child seeking a therapeutic abortion had to have paren-
tal consent. In this case, a 20 year old unmarried, pregnant minor
requested a therapeutic abortion, but did not have parental consent.
Dr. Ballard was her physician, and he, with her guardian ad litem,
sought a writ compelling the therapeutic abortion committee to
consider their application for an abortion for the girl under the
Therapeutic Abortion Act. Dr. Ballard's professional opinion was
that the girl qualified for an abortion under the law, but the com-
mittee refused to hear her application because she was unmarried,
18 In 1967 deaths per 100,000 population due to deliveries and complications of
pregnancies, childbirth, and the puerperium totalled 0.5, or 987 deaths nationwide.
Table 73, p. 58, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1970. There were 28 deaths
per 100,000 live births. Table 69, p. 55, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1970.
19 People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P.2d 194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354,
359 (1969). See also Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
20 Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
21 CAL. H. & S. CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1970).




unemancipated, and did not have parental consent. The court denied
the writ, saying that the primary intent of section 34.5 was "clearly
the preservation of the health and life of a pregnant unmarried
minor and the health and life of the unborn child." '24 It further
states that section 34.5 does not allow abortions without parental
consent even if the mother's life is in danger.25 In addition, the
court reasoned that abortion did not constitute "pregnancy-related
care" and, hence, an abortion could not be authorized at all under
section 34.5.26
AN ATTACK ON BALLARD v. ANDERSON
The Ballard case leaves the law in a somewhat ambiguous state.
Obviously the statutory provisions of applicable California law act
primarily to protect the health and life of the mother, whether she
is a minor or an adult. The Therapeutic Abortion Act makes no
mention or distinction between a minor and an adult in determining
eligibility for a legal abortion. The only word which the act uses in
reference to a potentially eligible woman is the noun "mother. '2 7
The legislature, when it enacted the Therapeutic Abortion
Act in 1967, was fully aware of the fact that statutes cannot be con-
strued standing alone. It knew that the courts had to consider a
statute in its total relation to all other appropriate statutes as well
as case law interpretation. Had it intended that the courts should
interpret section 34.5 together with the Therapeutic Abortion Act
as precluding a minor from giving consent to an abortion, it would
have included an appropriate provision in the Act. The majority
of the court in Ballard states that a court can only construe the
law, not expand it.28 Had the court properly construed and inter-
preted the nature and intent of section 34.5 and the Therapeutic
Abortion Act, it could not have held that an unemancipated minor
could not consent to a therapeutic abortion. Only an expansion of
the law could prevent such minors from giving valid consent to a
therapeutic abortion.
Were the petitioner in the Ballard case an adult, there would
have been no question that she was entitled to an abortion. How-
ever, because of the petitioner's minority, she was not extended the
same treatment. Ballard states that the purpose of section 34.5 is
24 Id. at 849, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
25 Id.
28 Id. at 851, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
27 Abortion is allowed if the Committee of the Medical Staff finds that "(T)here
is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical
or mental health of the mother; . . ." CAL. H. & S. COE § 25951 (West Supp. 1970).2 8Ballard v. Anderson, 12 Cal. App. 3d 846, 851, 90 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1970).
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the protection of both mother and child.29 As previously seen, how-
ever, this principle does not apply where an emancipated minor or
an adult is concerned. Is this to say that the state has a compelling
and over-riding interest in the protection of the fetus which rests
in the womb of an unemancipated minor child, but not the same
compelling interest in the fetus which rests in the womb of an eman-
cipated minor or an adult? Obviously no such distinction is possible.
The court in Ballard infers that an unemancipated minor child
does not have the capacity to make a rational, "adult" judgment in
determining that she wants an abortion. If this reasoning is followed,
the obvious conclusion is that an unemancipated minor does not
have the capacity to make a similar judgment in determining that
she does not want an abortion. Since "not wanting" an abortion
indicates a desire to remain pregnant, the court in Ballard has issued
a direct challenge to the nature and intent of existing law by holding,
in effect, that an unmarried, pregnant, unemancipated minor may
not carry a baby to term withoit the consent of her parents. While
this extension of the decision in Ballard is logically sound, any court
would be hard-pressed to uphold such an extension in light of its
manifest injustice. Obviously, if every minor, unwed mother-to-be
had the blessings and consent of her parent or parents, there would
be little need for section 34.5 other than for the provision which
disallows disaffirmance because of minority. 0 The court in Ballard
correctly stated that it is a function of the courts to construe the
law, not expand it. The court contends that it would be an expansion
of the law to declare that the word "care" in relation to pregnancy
necessarily subsumes its termination.3' It refuses to find any rela-
tion between care during pregnancy and abortion. The court said
that if the legislature had intended care to encompass abortion then
it would have inserted such a provision in its legislation. 2 The
court's point has some merit, but its obvious failure to adhere to
well recognized restrictions regarding expansion of the law leaves
us little reason for upholding the wisdom of its decision. It refuses
to "expand" the law for petitioner's benefit, but does not hesitate
to expand this same law for its own purposes. The court holds that
the purpose of section 34.5 is to protect the mother and the child.33
In the light of the previously mentioned legislative intent,34 such
an interpretation of section 34.5 would clearly be an expansion of the
29 Id. at 849, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
30 CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.5 (West 1954).
31 Ballard v. Anderson, 12 Cal. App. 3d. 846, 851, 90 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1970).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 849, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
34 See text accompanying notes 11-20 supra.
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law. If the legislature had intended protection of the fetus it could
have specifically provided so.
This brings us to the court's last argument of any possible
merit. The majority contends that abortion is not part of pregnancy-
related care. If abortion is not related to pregnancy, what is it re-
lated to? Abortion is the expulsion of the fetus at a time before it
has acquired the power of sustaining an independent life.35 The
early delivering is the abortion.86 In its primary meaning, the word
"abortion" means miscarriage.3 7 Pregnancy is "the existence of the
condition beginning at the moment of conception and terminating
with delivery of the child."' 8 Pregnancy is not terminated until the
child is delivered and free of the womb; the act of delivering is so
much a part of pregnancy that it almost seems impossible to think
of one without thinking of the other. Since early delivering is an
abortion, then it is clearly inescapable that abortion is related to
pregnancy. Justice Herndon, dissenting in the Ballard case, found
it inconceivable that one could deny that "the hospital, medical, and
surgical care necessarily required in the performance of a therapeutic
abortion on the consenting minor is 'related to her pregnancy.' ,89
Consequently, under both semantic and logical lines of reason-
ing, abortion achieves pregnancy-related status, and, thus far, no
valid reason appears to have been introduced which would prevent
a minor from consenting to such care.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Let us assume, however, that the decision rendered in Ballard
is not over-ruled by the California Supreme Court. This leaves us
with the situation in which a minor's parents can demand, and quite
possibly secure, their child's abortion. Since a child under the
Ballard decision cannot consent to a therapeutic abortion, neither
can she refuse one if her parents and the Therapeutic Abortion
Committee decree it. It is true that the committee has to approve
such an abortion in light of the guidelines set out in the Therapeutic
Abortion Act,4° but for what reason should the committee be re-
quired or even allowed to pass judgment on the child's case without
85 State v. Magnell, 3 Pennewill (Del.) 307, 51 A. 606 (1901).
36 Wells v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 A. 126
(1899).
87 See Wells v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 191 Pa. 207, 208, 43 A.
126, 127 (1899).
38 State v. Loomis, 90 N.J. 216, 100 A. 160, 161 (1917).
89 Ballard v. Anderson, 12 Cal. App. 3d. 846, 852, 90 Cal. Rptr. 468, 473 (1970)
(dissenting opinion of Herndon, J.).
40 CAL. H. & S. CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1970).
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her consent? When an adult wants an abortion, this committee of
at least three licensed physicians is called upon to determine the
extent of the risk to the mental and physical health of the mother
should the pregnancy continue. If this committee does not feel that
the danger is great enough, it can forbid the abortion.41 However,
in the case where the parents of a minor demand that she have an
abortion, the minor and her wishes would apparently be disregarded,
and she would be forced to submit her future and that of her baby
to the inquisitions and decision of this same committee. There is
great difficulty in imagining a situation in which our legal system
would allow such an injustice to occur in the form of an unwanted
abortion on a woman solely because of her minority. Surely if one
accepts the premise that failure to have an abortion could gravely
impair the mental or physical health of the mother, then one is
compelled to accept the converse. A law-imposed abortion could just
as seriously impair the mental or physical health of an unwilling
mother.
CONCLUSION
While it appears that an answer to this hypothetical problem
is apparent under a logical interpretation of the nature and intent
of existing law, the decision in Ballard points out the need for a more
thorough and explicit solution. The obvious remedy would be a
reversal of the holding in Ballard. A sound legal basis for a reversal
is clearly and unmistakably present. Section 34.5 of the California
Civil Code allows a minor to consent to all pregnancy-related care,42
and abortion is undeniably "related" to pregnancy. Hence, an en-
lightened interpretation of section 34.5 would allow any unmarried,
pregnant minor to consent to a therapeutic abortion if all require-
ments of the Therapeutic Abortion Act were met.43
The only other alternative is to broaden the consensual powers
given to minors to include abortion. This would necessarily limit
the existing power of parent over child, but would more fully accom-
plish our purported intentions to preserve and protect the health
and life of our citizens. Recognition of the right of a minor to con-
sent to an abortion would assist greatly in the eradication of the
illegal abortion mills now serving this same class of persons. It
would enable our minor citizens to secure the best in medical atten-
tion if they needed it, rather than seeking out the worst. Mississippi
already has a provision which appears to allow a minor to consent to
41 Id.
42 CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.6 (West Supp. 1970).
43 CAL. H. & S. CODE § 25951 (West Supp. 1970).
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an abortion." The Legislative Counsel of California is of the opinion
that an unmarried, pregnant minor should be allowed to request a
therapeutic abortion and consent to one should the committee grantit.45
Only by reversal of Ballard or appropriate legislation can we
be assured that all pregnant, minor, unmarried females will receive
the best of medical attention so vital to their interests and the col-
lective interest of the state. Only by such means can we also be
assured that all pregnant, unmarried, unemancipated minors will
be allowed to carry their babies to term without fear of interference
from the state. And finally, in the situation where the parents of an
unmarried, unemancipated minor demand that she have an abortion,
we will feel secure in the knowledge that the law will no longer
permit such a gross miscarriage of justice.
Colonel F. Betz
PARENT AND CHILD: PARENTAL IMMUNITY IN TORT
ABOLISHED: Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914 (1971).'
James Gibson, an unemancipated minor, was riding at night
in a car driven by his father. The father stopped the car on the
highway and directed James to get out of the car and fix the
position of the wheels on the jeep which they were towing behind
the car. James was hit by another car and injured while carrying
out his father's directions. James filed a claim against his father
alleging negligence. His father filed a general demurrer to the com-
plaint on the ground that a minor child has no cause of action
against his parent for simple negligence.' The demurrer was sus-
tained without leave to amend.
The key issue facing the court was whether a child may bring
an action against his parent for simple negligence. Justice Sullivan,
writing the opinion for the court,3 stated that parental immunity to
tort actions instituted by their unemancipated children was now
abolished.' The rationale of the court was threefold: First, when
there is negligence, the rule is liability, not immunity.5 The court
44 See Miss. CODE ANN. § 7129-81(h) (Supp. 1968).
45 See dissenting opinion of J. Herndon in Ballard v. Anderson, 12 Cal. App. 3d.
846, 852, 90 Cal. Rptr. 468, 473 (1970), citing letter from the California Legislative
Counsel to Senator Anthony C. Beilenson, May 13, 1970. Letter on file in the office
of the Santa Clara Lawyer.
1 3 Cal. 3d 914, - P.2d - (January 25, 1971).
2 Id. at 916.
8 Justice McComb dissented with no opinion.
4 Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922,- P.2d - (1971).
5 Id. at 922.
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said that this basic doctrine of compensation for injury proximately
caused by the wrongful action of another governs "in the absence
of statute or compelling reasons of public policy."6 Second, the
notion that family discord would result if such suits were allowed
was held to be unsound.7 It was the court's position that family
tranquility would more likely be disrupted by denying the action
than by allowing it.8 Finally, liability insurance has a cushioning
effect on intra-family suits.9 The court noted that liability insurance
plays a key role in negligence actions by carrying the burden of pay-
ment with no direct loss to the parents.
The decision of the California Supreme Court in the Gibson
case carved out a new area of tort liability and renounced a doctrine
long-established in California. An understanding of the full impact
of this decision requires a brief history of intra-family immunity.
There is no English common law doctrine of parental immunity
in tort.'0 The doctrine was first established in the United States
80 years ago by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Hewlett v.
George." That case relied on no precedents and used as its only
rationale the public policy of maintaining family harmony. How-
ever, a number of the states soon adopted this position.' California
followed the majority position in Trudell v. Leatherby 3 which
established parental immunity in order to minimize family conflict.
This doctrine of parental immunity has gradually eroded in
the last several years. 4 Parents have not been immunized from their
willful or malicious torts.' Moreover, the estate of a deceased parent
in one case was held liable in a tort suit by a minor child.' Further-
more, where a parent has forfeited his parental position by gross
irresponsibility, he is no longer protected.17 Also, no protection is
6 Id., quoting, Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 695, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (1962).
7 Id. at 920.
8 Id. at 919.
9 Id. at 922.
10 W. PRossFa, LAW OF TORTS, § 116 at 886-87 (3d ed. 1964). See also McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HtAv. L. REv. 1030, 1059-60 (1929).
11 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
12 Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Wick v. Wick, 192
Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926).
13 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931) (minor child injured while a passenger in a car
driven by his stepmother).
14 Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HAST. L.J. 201
(1967).
15 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Wright v. Wright, 85
Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923
(1951) ; Cowgil v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
16 Davis v. Smith, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314,
211 A.2d 410 (1965).
17 Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952) (where parent be-
1971]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
given when another relationship, in addition to the parent-child rela-
tionship, exists at the time of the injury to the child.18 Finally, the
parent as an employee is denied protection when he inflicts injury
while in the scope of his employment.' Similarly, the employer is
denied protection when the parent-employee causes injury to his
child.2" It should be noted that in all jurisdictions where intra-family
immunity exists, no distinction has been drawn between suits where
the child or the parent is the plaintiff.21
California's doctrine of intra-family immunity has been under
constant attack almost since its inception, with the courts doing
everything but abolishing it. Strong language in Emery v. Emery22
expressed distaste for the doctrine. Then inter-spousal immunity
for intentional and negligent torts was abolished.2"
In 1971, the California courts found themselves in this posi-
tion: spouses could sue each other in tort; 4 siblings could also sue
each other in tort; 25 children could sue their parents during their
minority over property interests. 26 The Gibson court could not find
the logic in maintaining the immunity in negligent tort actions
only. That immunity too has now been abolished.
Although the Gibson case seems to be the inevitable culmination
of the line of cases dealing with intra-family immunity, some of the
ramifications of the decision may not have been given proper con-
sideration by the court.
A crucial issue facing the court is public policy. Two conflicting
policies compete for predominance: maintenance of family harmony
comes intoxicated and inflicts injury to the child intentionally or negligently, he loses
immunity).
18 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (carrier-passenger rela-
tionship existed which made the parent-child relationship incidental, allowing a cause
of action by the child).
19 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
20 Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107 (1930);
Stapleton v. Stapleton, 85 Ga. App. 728, 70 S.E.2d 156 (1952). California is contra.
Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938) (child was
injured by the negligence of his father while the parent was within the scope of his
employment. Held: defendant district not liable to the child).
. 21 Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940) ; Detwiler v. Detwiler,
162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948).
22 45 Cal. 2d 421, 430, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955).
23 Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d
692, 376 P.2d 70 (1962).
24 Id.
25 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
26 Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 A. 292 (1925); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y.
317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
27 "It would be anomalous for us to give greater protection to property rights
than to personal rights." Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 919, n.7, - P.2d - (1971).
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versus giving the child a remedy for a wrong.28 In this context the
court apparently did not take into account the fact that a child may
not bring suit in his own behalf; a guardian must bring suit for
him.29 In most cases this would mean that the other spouse must
bring suit for his or her child against the negligent spouse. Yet the
court seems to conclude that public policy dictates that the rights
of the child, such as keeping his property intact and protecting his
physical well-being and potential earning power, must be enforced
by the courts through their only available means-money damages.80
The recovery of money damages raises the issue of the measure
of the damages. The parent-child relationship presents some unique
problems in this area. First, the parent must pay for the medical
expenses of his minor child if he can afford them."' If the parent
does pay, it is difficult to see how the child could recover for these
expenses in his negligence suit. Secondly, a parent usually may re-
cover for the loss of earning capacity of his minor child before
majority is reached where a third party has caused the injury. 2
However, if the parent himself was the negligent party the law
would seemingly deny him this recovery on a theory of unjust en-
richment. 8
The Gibson court did not discuss fully the source of the funds
to satisfy the judgment. To support its position, the court relied
heavily on the availability of auto and home liability insurance to
satisfy the child's judgment in most cases. 4 But the court did not
deal with the difficulties arising when the child is listed on the
policy as an insured along with his parent, and the parent is held
liable to the child. Could insurance companies insert clauses in their
policies absolving themselves of liability in such cases? If such
clauses could be inserted, then conceivably one of the bases for the
decision would disappear. The important point to be gleaned from
the above discussion is-irrespective of whether there is any prob-
lem with two insureds on the same policy, if parents are now liable
28 "For every wrong there is a remedy." CAL. Civ. CODE § 3523 (West 1970).
29 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 372 (West 1970).
80 See Note, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 342 (1931).
81 Slaughter v. Zimman, 105 Cal. App. 2d 623, 234 P.2d 94 (1951); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 196 (West 1970).
82 Girard v. Irvine, 97 Cal. App. 377, 385-86, 275 P. 840, 844 (1929) ; CAL. CODE
CIV. PaoC. § 376 (West 1970).
3 If the rule in McManus v. Arnold Taxi Corp., 82 Cal. App. 215, 255 P. 775
(1927), is applied to the case of a child suing his parent, the child should be able to
recover for pain and suffering plus the loss of earning power after majority; the parent
would have no recovery. See Note, 20 CALIF. L. REv. 342, 343 (1931).
84 Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, - P.2d - (1971), quoting with ap-
proval, James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57
YALE L.J. 549, 553 (1948).
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to their children for simple negligence, the effect on the already-high
insurance rates may be catastrophic. It is not beyond reason to argue
that insurance companies could limit the amount of coverage to
parents of large families or even deny them protection altogether.
The prevalence of liability insurance increases the possibility
for collusion between parent and child."5 Such a possibility was fore-
seen by the court and discussed at length."' The court observed
that the California automobile guest statute3 7 was enacted to min-
imize fraud and collusion in the area of automobile accidents. The
court, however, appears to assume that the child would be a guest
in his parent's car. 3 Is it possible that when a parent directs his
child to accompany him in the car that the child is a guest? Sup-
pose the child asks his parents to drive him to school as he has no
other means to get there. Would the law consider him a guest when
his parents have a duty to provide for his education?3 ' That a child
is a guest in his parent's car would appear to be an unwarranted
assumption. In point of fact, the guest statute seems to have little
limiting effect on the possibilities of fraud and collusion when a child
is injured in his parent's automobile.
Another area which apparently escaped the attention of the
court is the imputation of negligence concept embodied in Section
17150 of the California Vehicle Code.40 If the husband is the owner
of the automobile, California law imputes negligence to him when
his wife is driving with his express or implied permission.4 If,
35 See Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960); Parks v. Parks,
390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) ; Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948).36 "It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that the judi-
cial processes are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person otherwise entitled
because in some future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion." Gibson v.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920, - P.2d - (1971), quoting with approval, Klein v. Klein,
58 Cal. 2d 692, 696, 376 P.2d 70, 73 (1962).
37 "No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven by an-
other person with his permission and no person who as a guest accepts a ride in any
vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other
person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle or
against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the driver on account of
personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during the ride, unless the
plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted
from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver." CAL. VE1.' CODE § 17158
(West 1970).
38 "This prohibition may eliminate some potential child-parent suits, which fre-
quently involve injuries received by the child while a 'guest' in an automobile driven
by his parent." Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920, n.9, - P.2d - (1971).
39 CAL. CIV. CODE § 196 (West 1970).
40 "Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury
to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the
operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any
person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the
owner." CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150 (West 1970).
41 Cooke v. Tsipouroglou, 59 Cal. 2d 660, 381 P.2d 940 (1963).
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therefore, a child is injured while his mother is driving negligently,
the child apparently has a cause of action against both parents. 2
A crucial question which underlies this entire area is how far
will the courts extend this new right of children. For instance, will
a suit lie against the parents for pre-natal injuries negligently in-
flicted on the fetus? The rule in California is that a child may
recover against third persons for injuries inflicted on him before
he was born43 so long as the suit is brought within six years after
birth.44 The rationale of the Gibson case may compel extention of
this cause of action to parents where they have been the tortfeasors.
Here again problems may arise concerning the family harmony when
one parent must act as guardian to bring suit against the other in
behalf of their child.
Examining the question in another light, will parents now be
able to sue their children in tort? The general rule to date is that
no such suit will lie.45 Will the Gibson decision, however, open the
gates to litigation by parents against their children? It should be
noted that the child's lack of assets may minimize the litigation in
this area.
Another area into which this new right of children may be ex-
tended is into the homes of unusual religious practioners. For ex-
ample, may a child now sue his Christian Scientist parents for failing
to give him a blood transfusion? This area raises some first amend-
ment questions, the existence of which the Gibson court did not
discuss.
Finally, it must be asked, may a child now sue his parents for
such trivial imprudences such as not taking the child to the doctor
when he has a sore throat or to the dentist when he has a tooth
ache? If damages are suffered, perhaps a suit will lie. In fact,
parents might reconsider having children in view of the new complex
legal problems involved.
The existence and extent of these problems will be determined
by future decisions. One may only speculate now as to the implica-
tions of the Gibson decision. The court felt that the child's remedy
was of greater importance than the problems mentioned in this note.
The result remains to be seen.
Steven D. Siner
42 Id. (husband was driving but the court left unanswered the question if the
same rule applies if the wife is driving and the husband is the owner of the vehicle
with management and control over it). See also Brunn, California Personal Injury
Damage Awards To Married Persons, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 587, 601 (1965).
43 Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 637, 92 P.2d 678, 682 (1939) ; Sinkler
v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
44 Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 270 P.2d 885 (1954); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 29 (West 1970).
45 See Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942).
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PROPERTY LAW: MIDDLEMAN ESCROWS: A MECCA FOR
JUDGMENT CREDITORS? Majewsky v. Empire Construction
Co. Ltd., 2 Cal. 3d 478, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970).
The case of Majewsky v. Empire Construction Co., Ltd.' in-
volved a variation on the common middleman escrow situation.2
In that case, Cuslidge, as seller, and Waugh, as purchaser, agreed3
to give escrow instructions to an escrow holder for the sale of Black-
acre for $11,000. Waugh, a judgment debtor, hired an agent to
find a purchaser for Blackacre for $12,500. Waugh's agent agreed4
with Majewsky to give escrow instructions on the sale of Black-
acre for $12,500. There were technically two escrows, but the escrow
holder was the same' and the two escrows were closed at the same
time.6
In reality Waugh is acquiring the land from Cuslidge and re-
selling it to Majewsky for a $1,500 profit. Since Waugh's agent
signed the agreement with Majewsky as "agent for seller," Majew-
sky had no knowledge of Waugh's part in the transaction. The title
search Majewsky ordered showed title free and clear in Cuslidge
because the Cuslidge-Waugh agreement had not yet been acted
upon.
As a result of Majewsky, problems will now arise where judg-
ment liens have previously been recorded against the middleman.
According to Section 674 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,7
a judgment once recorded becomes a lien upon all the real property
held or subsequently acquired by a judgment debtor. Thus, the
1 Majewsky v. Empire Construction Co. Ltd., 2 Cal. 3d 478, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Majewsky].
2 A common middleman escrow occurs where A, as grantor, and B, as grantee,
give instructions to X, the escrow holder, for the sale of Whiteacre. Later B, as
grantor, and C, as grantee, also give instructions to X for the sale of Whiteacre. The
position of B is that of a middleman, and an escrow is used, thus the term "middle-
man escrow." See M. OGDEN, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW 21.4(4)(c) (1956).
8 In Majewsky, a printed form adopted by the San Francisco Real Estate Board
entitled Uniform Agreement of Sale and Deposit Receipt was used.
4 In Majewsky, a printed form identical to that used in the Cuslidge-Waugh
transaction was used. However, it did not contain the names of Cuslidge or Waugh.
5 In Majewsky, the county recorder's stamp on both deeds read "1965 Jan. 28
2:24 P.M." Thus, C's deed to W preceded W's deed to Majewsky by less than sixty
seconds.
6 M. OGDEN, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW 21.4(4) (c) (1956).
7 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 674 (West 1954) provides in part: "an abstract of
judgment or decree of any court of this State including a judgment of any court sitting
as a small claims court, or any court of record in the United States . . . may be
recorded with the recorder of any county and from such recording the judgment or
decree becomes a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt
from execution, in such county owned by him at the time, or which he may after-
wards and before the lien expires, acquire .... "
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property becomes liable for the judgment debt. In Majewsky the
California Supreme Court applied section 674 so that the creditors
of the middleman could attach his transient interest. As a result,
the creditors of the middleman, who held title momentarily, were
allowed to encumber the title of the subsequent bona fide purchaser
who had no knowledge of the middleman's position. In so holding
the California Supreme Court may have created a Mecca for judg-
ment creditors.
The purpose of this note is to explore the remedies the court
could have applied in order to provide a more satisfactory and
equitable disposition of future middleman escrow cases.
BACKGROUND
The Majewsky court refused to apply or interpret any existing
law which would leave the subsequent grantee's title unencumbered.
Therefore we must first examine the available remedies.
Prior to Majewsky, a California Court of Appeal had held that
a judgment lien did not attach to a mere naked title but only to thejudgment debtor's actual interest in the real estate.8 If the debtor
held as a trustee, he would possess only naked title and no liens
would attach. While recognizing this to be the law, the Majewsky
court refused to regard the middleman as a trustee with only naked
title."° The court rejected two theories under which a trust could
be imposed-namely the resulting and constructive trust.
The author feels that the court may have been correct in re-
jecting the resulting trust theory. However, the court was probably
wrong in not recognizing that this middleman escrow gave rise
to a constructive trust.
RESULTING TRUST THEORY
The underlying theory of a resulting trust is that the intent of
the parties be carried out. Thus, the general rule" regarding re-
sulting trusts in land sale situations is that where a transfer of real
property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by
8 Wheeler v. Treftzs, 228 Cal. App. 2d 271, 274, 39 Cal. Rptr. 507, 509 (1964).
9 Id.
10 Furthermore, the courts have held that a judgment creditor does not have the
status of a bona fide purchaser and is treated as a purchaser with notice. Therefore
he is subject to any latent equities which could be asserted against the debtor.
Majewsky, 2 Cal. 3d 478, 490, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 827 (1970).
11 Fulton v. Jansen, 99 Cal. 587, 34 P. 351 (1893); 5 A. ScoTr, THE LAW oF
TausTS § 404.2 (3d ed. 1967); G. BooaEaR, THE LAW op TRUST § 52 (2d ed. 1942).
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another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person who paid
the purchase price, absent any showing that either party intended
that the other take a beneficial interest.
In all types of resulting trusts, intention is an essential element.
However, that intention need not be explicitly stated. 2 In fact, when
there is a transfer of real property to one and the consideration is
paid by another, equity infers that the transferee was not intended
to receive and hold title as the beneficial owner.' Instead, a trust
arises in favor of the party who actually supplies the valuable con-
sideration.
A good example of the resulting trust is found in Murphy v.
Clayton.4 There the plaintiff and his deceased friend each paid
half the purchase price. Title was taken in the decedent's name
only. At his death, creditors of the decedent tried to assert their
claims against the entire property. The creditors argued they had
priority over the plaintiff's secret equity, but the court imposed
a resulting trust in favor of the plaintiff as to his one half interest
in the property."5
Justice Mosk, dissenting in Majewsky, felt that Majewsky
was precisely the type of case in which an intent should be presumed
by operation of law under Section 853 of the California Civil Code.'
The "transfer of real property" that the statute refers to was
initially made to the judgment debtor-middleman. And the "con-
sideration thereof" was paid entirely by the subsequent grantee,
Majewsky, since his were the only funds deposited into escrow.
To the contrary, the Majewsky majority took the position that
a resulting trust does not arise solely on the basis that money or
property of one person has been used by another to purchase real
estate. Instead it is based on the fact that one has intentionally
advanced to the other the consideration to make a purchase in the
other's name.' The trust arises because it is the natural presump-
tion that the ostensible purchaser should acquire and hold property
for the one who paid the purchase price."' Thus, the intent must
be present, though it need not be expressed.
12 Seabury v. Costello, 209 Cal. App. 2d 640, 645, 26 Cal. Rptr. 248, 250 (1968).
18 3 J. POMERoy, EQUTy JURISPRUDENCE § 1031 (4th ed. 1967).
14 Murphy v. Clayton, 113 Cal. 153, 45 P. 267 (1896).
15 Id.
18 CAL. CIv. CODE § 853 (West 1954) provides: "When a transfer of real prop-
erty is made to one person, and the consideration therefore is paid by or for another, a
trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is
made."
17 Majewsky, 2 Cal. 3d 478, 485, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 824 (1970).
18 Lezinsky v. Mason Malt Liquor Distilling Co., 185 Cal. 240, 243, 198 P. 884,
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The author feels that the Majewsky majority was correct in
its interpretation of Section 853. Although that section does not
mention intent, the courts have found intent to be a crucial ele-
ment. 9 Consequently, it would be straining the doctrine of inferred
intent to apply a resulting trust in Majewsky. How could the sub-
sequent grantee intend that the debtor-middleman take title for
him when he had no knowledge of the debtor's existence?
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST THEORY
The underlying principle of a constructive trust is the equitable
prevention of unjust enrichment due to fraud or the abuse of a
confidential relationship. A constructive trust2 ° is raised to com-
pel2' a person who has received property fraudulently 2 to transfer
it to the person defrauded. 3
Thus, if one person uses another's money without the owner's
consent, a constructive trust, and not a resulting trust, will be im-
posed. 4 A constructive trust will also be raised where property
has been transferred to the wrong transferee. 5
In 1886 a California court said that equity will impress a con-
structive trust where legal title to property has been obtained
fraudulently.26 A constructive trust will also be imposed where the
property is obtained through misrepresentation, concealment or
under any inequitable circumstances.
886 (1921); see Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal. 2d 439, 182 P.2d 557 (1947); Treager
v. Friedman, 79 Cal. App. 2d 151, 179 P.2d 387 (1947).
19 1 J. PERRY, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 126 (1929); 4 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY oF CALiORNiA LAW § 80 at 2964 (1960) [hereinafter cited as WrrKW].
20 See Comment, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 1268 (1968), for a general discussion of un-
just enrichment in constructive trusts.
21 "The trust is passive, the only duty being to convey the property," 4 Wrrxne
§ 87 at 2970 (1960).
22 CALi. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2224 (West 1954) provides that "one who gains a thing
by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrong-
ful act, is, unless he has some other right thereto, an involuntary trustee, of the
thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it."
23 It has been called the most important contribution of equity to the remedies
for the prevention of unjust enrichment, J. DAwsoN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 26 (1951).
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds ex-
pression. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380
(1919).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 440(h) (1950).
25 Fulton v. Jansen, 99 Cal. 587, 34 P. 351 (1893); 5 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 404.2 (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUST § 52 (2d ed. 1942).
26 Plummer v. Brown, 70 Cal. 544, 12 P. 464 (1886).
27 See Crosley v. Clark, 132 Cal. 1, 63 P. 1022 (1901) ; Walter H. Leimert Co. v.
Woodson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 186, 275 P.2d 95 (1954); Strausberg v. Conner, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 398, 215 P.2d 504 (1950); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 166, 167, 169,
184, 185 (1937).
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In the past a constructive trust has been imposed where a
parolee from state prison paid for land and had it placed in the
name of a woman who had made fraudulent promises to marry
him. 28 Similarly, another court has held that a constructive trust may
be imposed where a real estate agent represented that he would
obtain land for his principal but instead he purchased it for him-
self. 9 The court imposed the trust because the agent had acquired
property to which he was not justly entitled.
A constructive trust is founded on the principle that no one
can take advantage of his own wrong." It extends to practically any
case where there is a wrongful acquisition or detention of property.81
Thus, unlike the resulting trust, intent is not a crucial element.
Rather, the question is whether there is any wrongful acquisition
or detention of. property. 2 Consequently, the applicability of the
constructive trust theory is dependent upon a finding of unjust
enrichment.
In Majewsky the California Supreme Court found no fraudu-
lent act by the judgment debtor nor any unjust enrichment." The
Majewsky majority held that the only possibility of fraud 4 was
that of the title company in not requiring the judgment debtor to
deposit his own money for the purchase of the property. The court
refused to impute fraud to the judgment debtor.
However, this author feels that both fraud and unjust enrich-
ment are evident. As Justice Tobriner points out in his dissent, there
was no need to impute wrongdoing to the judgment debtor because
it was clear on the record.s5 The judgment debtor submitted a
grant deed into escrow. That type of deed warrants, as a matter
of law, that the grantee's estate is "free from encumbrances done,
made, or suffered by the grantor.... Since encumbrances include
28 Hall v. Hall, 98 Cal. App. 2d 209, 219 P.2d 808 (1954).
29 Walter H. Leimert Co. v. Woodson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 186, 275 P.2d 95 (1954).
30 Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 494, 185 P. 174, 176 (1919) ; see Estrada v. Garcia,
132 Cal. App. 2d 545, 282 P.2d 547 (1955); Scott, The Expectant Legatee, 63
HARV. L. REV. 108 (1949); 1958 A.S. 609; Anno. 11 A.L.R. 808.
81 West v. Stainbach, 108 Cal. App. 2d 806, 240 P.2d 366 (1956); Rankin v.
Satir, 75 Cal. App. 2d 691, 171 P.2d 78 (1946).
82 See Estrada v. Garcia, 132 Cal. App. 2d 545, 282 P.2d 547 (1955).
88 Majewsky, 2 Cal. 3d 478, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970).
84 For a definition of fraud see Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534
(1959).
85 Majewsky, 2 Cal. 3d 478, 490, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 826 (1970).
86 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1113 (West 1954) provides: "From the use of the word
'grant' in any conveyance by which an estate of inheritance or fee simple is passed,
the following covenants, and none other, on the part of the grantor for himself and
for his heirs, to the grantee, his heirs, and assigns, are implied, unless restrained by
express terms contained in such conveyance. . .2. That such estate is at the time of
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all liens upon real property, 7 the judgment debtor fraudulently
represented that his land was free and clear of liens. Furthermore,
the debtor-middleman did not reveal to his grantee or to the title
company that seven abstracts of judgments, or liens had been re-
corded against him. This concealed information88 was material,8 9
and both reliance thereon and injury therefrom are clear. If thejudgment debtor knew or should have known of the recorded ab-
stracts of judgments-and the facts in Majewsky indicate he did
know of the liens-his failure to disclose this fact constitutes
fraud. 0 Accordingly, a constructive trust could be raised.
In Majewsky counsel for the defendant apparently unsuccess-
fully argued that since defendant's grantee purchased the property
in reliance upon an abstract of title which he himself sought, he
was not misled by the judgment debtor. However, this is not the
law. The courts have held that an independent investigation or an
examination of the property does not preclude reliance on repre-
sentations when the falsity of the statement is not apparent from
a reasonable inspection.4 Likewise, personal inspection is no defense
when the conditions are not visible and are known only to the
seller.42 For example, the courts have held that even though a ven-
dee had examined the premises before purchasing, his recovery for
damages was not barred because his inspection, no matter how
thorough, could not have revealed the defect.4
When Majewsky, the debtor's grantee, examined the property,
title was still in the original grantor's name (Cuslidge). Therefore,
Majewsky could not have found the defect since it did not exist
until after his examination. Thus Majewsky's examination of the
property would not prevent the imposition of a constructive trust.
the execution of such conveyance free from encumbrances done, made, or suffered
by the grantor, or for any person claiming under him."87 Id. § 1114 provides: "The term 'incumbrances' includes taxes, assessments, and
all liens upon real property."
88 See Rothstein v. Janss Investment Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 113 P.2d 465
(1941).
89 The word lien "in its broadest sense and common acceptance, denotes a legal
claim or charge on property, either real or personal, as security for payment of somedebt or obligation and includes every case in which personalty or realty is charged
with payment of a debt." Gray v. Home, 48 Cal. App. 2d 372, 375, 119 P.2d 779,
780 (1942).
40 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1710.33 (West 1954) provides: "a deceit, within the meaning
of the last section is . .. the suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to dis-
close it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want
of communication of that fact; . . ."
41 Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 435, 159 P.2d 958, 971 (1945);Shearer v. Cooper, 21 Cal. 2d 695, 134 P.2d 764 (1943) ; Barder v. McClung, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 692, 209 P.2d 808 (1949).42 Bagdasarian v. Gragnon, 31 Cal. 2d 744, 192 P.2d 935 (1948).
48 Rothstein v. Janss Investment Corp., 45 Cal. App. 2d 64, 113 P.2d 465 (1941).
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The cases also demonstrate the invalidity of an argument that
his grantee was bound by constructive notice of the seven recorded
judgments." It is established that the purpose of the recording
act is to protect bona fide purchasers for value.4 5 It does not operate
to protect those who make fraudulent misrepresentations.46
A constructive trust should have been imposed in Majewsky,
not only because of the debtor's misrepresentations and fraud, but
also because of his unjust enrichment,47 which is clear from the
record. The debtor conveyed land worth $12,500, but encumbered
with liens worth $50,000. In effect, the interest he conveyed was
valueless.48 In return the debtor received a $1,500 profit on the
sale of the property. Thus, unjust enrichment provides another
basis for raising a constructive trust.
Escrow's Effect on Constructive Trust
The majority opinion was quick to point out that the decision
to use a single escrow was made by the title company and not
by the judgment debtor. Apparently the court reasoned that the
plaintiff's constructive trust theory was based on the use of a single
escrow. The fact that a single escrow was used does make it easier
to trace the misappropriated funds, but it neither helps nor hinders
the imposition of a constructive trust.
The differences between the single and double escrow are
almost inconsequential insofar as they affect the raising of a con-
structive trust. In the single escrow, the escrow holder simplifies
the procedure by treating the two simultaneous conveyances as
one. In the more common double escrow arrangement, the dual
instructions for the two transactions are kept separate and treated
44 The recorded abstracts of judgment are public records. The victims of fraudu-
lent misrepresentations as to title, however, are not denied relief under a theory of
constructive public notice of public records. Recovery is barred only if reliance on
the representations was not justifiable. Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 414, 115 P.2d
977, 980 (1941); Barder v. McClung, 93 Cal. App. 2d 692, 696, 209 P.2d 808, 811
(1949).
46 Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 115 P.2d 977 (1941) ; Annot., 136 A.L.R. 1291.
46 If the judgment debtor did not know of the abstracts of judgment (the evi-
dence in Majewsky apparently did not suggest this) the transaction would be tainted
by mutual mistake. Since section 2224 of the California Civil Code provides an in-
voluntary (constructive) trust may be imposed on grounds of either fraud or mistake,
the distinction is moot.
47 It has been suggested that the requirement of unjust enrichment has engendered
a fight between those who want to expand the common law reference to its ultimate
ethico-judicial principles and those content to stay clearly in defined paths. A victory
for those favoring expansion has seemingly occurred in a recent California decision.
See The Necessity for Unjust Enrichment in Constructive Trusts in California: Elliott
v. Elliott, 19 HASTINGs L. J. 1268 (1968).
48 Majewsky, 2 Cal. 3d 478, 491, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (1970).
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as two distinct conveyances. No matter which type of escrow was
used, a constructive trust could have been imposed in Majewsky.
In Majewsky the fact that a single escrow was used merely
makes it easier to trace the misappropriated funds, since the two
conveyances were kept together by the escrow. The use of this
type of escrow in Majewsky seems more than mere happenstance
because, due to the arrangement, the debtor-middleman was not
required to put up any money. The outstanding judgments against
the debtor totalled $50,000 and one would wonder whether he could
have raised the $11,000 needed to complete his purchase from the
original grantor (Cuslidge).
It makes no difference who chose to use a single escrow be-
cause in Majewsky the unjust enrichment is plain and fraud is
also present. Therefore, it would appear the remedy of imposing
a constructive trust is available whether a single or double escrow
was used.
Throughout its discussion of both resulting and constructive
trusts, the court emphasized that the provision of section 674 would
be frustrated if its efficacy were conditioned upon the length of time
the judgment debtor owned the property. However, a more equitable
result can be reached in cases of this kind without frustrating
the purpose of section 674 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
as the Majewsky court feared. Section 674 was obviously enacted
to protect creditors and put bona fide purchasers from the judgment
debtor on notice by way of recording. In Majewsky the liens were
recorded, but the bona fide purchaser relied on the preliminary
title report showing title free and clear. Thus, at the time Majewsky
searched the records, nothing was revealed since title was still in
the original grantor (Cuslidge).
In searching for possible remedies such as constructive or
resulting trusts, the purpose is not to emasculate section 674 but
to avoid an inequitable application of it.
DUTIES OF THE EscRow
Since the Majewsky court did not reject the agency liability
of the escrow holder,4" this may be the only relief bona fide pur-
49 The rules applicable to disclosure of escrow instructions in a middleman escrow
situation are as follows:
A is entitled to see B's instructions relative to the purchase from A, but he is not
entitled to see information as to the instructions between B and C.
B is entitled to see either A or C's instructions.
C is entitled to see only the instructions concerning the sale from B to C.
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chasers presently possess. An escrow holder is the agent"0 of all of
the parties to the escrow prior to the performance of the conditions
of the escrow. 1 As such he bears a fiduciary relationship to the
escrow parties,52 owing to each the obligation to act according to
the ordinary principles of agency.3s
The escrow holder must comply strictly with the instructions
of his principal. 54 If he disposes of the property of his principal in
violation of these instructions, or otherwise breaches that duty,
he will be liable for any loss occasioned thereby.5 It is also the
duty of the escrow holder to exercise ordinary skill and diligence in
his employment. 5 If he acts negligently he is liable for any resulting
loss. 5 7
Thus, in Majewsky the title company could not disburse the
$12,500 deposited by Majewsky until it had received a deed from
the debtor (Waugh) to Majewsky. Even though the buyer may
have deposited money into the escrow, the buyer retains title to the
money until the conditions of the transfer have been performed."'
If the seller does not comply with the conditions, the money is
refundable to the buyer.59 Until the seller's compliance with the
condition, the escrow must protect the buyer by withholding from
the seller the money placed in the escrow and by returning it to the
buyer on failure of the prescribed event.00 Therefore, Majewsky's
funds are his own until disbursed by the escrow.
X, the escrow holder,. is under no legal duty to inform A or C as to the terms or
existence of the escrow to which either is not a party, assuming no express instructions
to the contrary. M. OcnEN, CArIroRuq.A REAL PROPERTY LAW § 21.4(4) (c) (1956).
50 One of the duties of an agent is to disclose relevant facts to his principal, see
CAL. CiV. CODE § 2020 (West 1954).
51 Shreeves v. Pearson, 194 Cal. 699, 230 P. 448 (1924); Todd v. Vestermark,
145 Cal. App. 2d 374, 302 P.2d 347 (1956).
52 Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1963).
53 See Rianda v. San Benito Title Guarantee Co., 35 Cal. 2d 170, 217 P.2d 25
(1950).
54 Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33, 25 Cal. Rptr.
65 (1962); Rianda v. San Benito Title Guarantee Co., 35 Cal. 2d 170, 217 P.2d
25 (1950); Karras v. Title Insurance and Guaranty Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 659, 259
P.2d 886 (1953).
55 Id.
56 Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1963).
57 Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33, 25 Cal. Rptr.
65 (1962); Rianda v. San Benito Title Guarantee Co., 35 Cal. 2d 170, 217 P.2d 25
(1950); Karras v. Title Insurance and Guaranty Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 659, 259 P.2d
886 (1953).
58 Kellogg v. Curry, 101 Cal. App. 2d 856, 225 P.2d 381 (1951).
5o Widess v. Title Insurance and Trust Co., 112 Cal. App. 343, 296 P. 899 (1931).
60 Karras v. Title Insurance and Guaranty Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 659, 258 P.2d
866 (1953). See Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33, 25
Cal. Rptr. 65 (1962); Rianda v, San Benito Title Guarantee Co., 35 Cal. 2d 170, 217
P.2d 25 (1950),
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By depositing into escrow a grant deed with warranties of title
which were not performed, and by not revealing the existence of the
judgment liens, the judgment debtor led the title company into the
mistaken belief that he held an unencumbered title. This mistaken
belief brought about the wrongful appropriation of Majewsky's
funds. In lieu of the Majewsky holding, the buyer's only remedy
may be in proceeding against the escrow holder on a negligence
basis. In Majewsky the negligent act of the escrow would be the
failure to disclose to the subsequent grantee (Majewsky) that his
grantor was actually a debtor. Another negligent act of the escrow
could be its acceptance of a deed whose warranties were defective."'
Even if a double escrow were used, the injured party might
still be able to proceed against the escrow holder for negligence,
since the escrow holder may have violated his fiduciary duty by
forwarding a grant deed falsely showing title free and clear.62
CONCLUSION
The court in Majewsky failed to find a resulting trust. This
conclusion appears to be valid because of the difficulty with the
intent element.
The court erred, in the author's opinion, when it refused to
apply a constructive trust when all the elements were present. The
plaintiff (Majewsky) payed $12,500 into escrow, presumably to
the original grantor (Cuslidge). He was unaware of the judgment
debtor's interest in the property. He never consented to the judg-
ment debtor's (Waugh) gaining any interest in the property. "To
now saddle plaintiff with liens for some $50,000 worth of indebted-
ness-approximately four times the value of the property-merely
because the judgment debtor acquired a theoretical transitory title
is the ultimate in exalting form over substance."6
The application of a constructive trust would bring about the
most equitable result under the circumstances. The original grantor
61As Justice Tobriner's dissent astutely points out, the argument for construc-
tive trust may seem to rely on circular reasoning because the assumption that the
judgment liens would attach to the property is what gives rise to the duty to disclose
the liens. However, the raising of a constructive trust prevents the liens from attaching
and thus contradicts that assumption.
The land originally conveyed by Cuslidge may also be held in constructive trust,
since a portion of the trust fund was paid to Cuslidge in consideration for the title
to the land in question. As a result, the subsequent grantee (Majewsky) would have
priority over other creditors of the debtors because they are beneficiaries under the
trust. 4 WITKIN § 56 at 2941 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202
(1937).
62 Spaziani v. Millar, 215 Cal. App. 2d 667, 670, 30 Cal. Rptr. 658, 667 (1963).
63 Majewsky, 2 Cal. 3d 478, 487, 85 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (1970).
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has sold his property for valuable consideration; the judgment
debtor gains nothing and stands to lose more; the position of the
judgment creditors remains unchanged; and the subsequent grantee
(Majewsky) gains the land with an unencumbered title.
If a constructive trust is not applied, the bona fide purchaser
may have some protection on the basis of the agency liability of
the escrow. This, however, shifts the responsibility from the judg-
ment debtor-the real culprit-to the escrow holder, who may
be entirely innocent.
The court, in its zeal to protect judgment creditors, has squan-
dered the rights of the always-to-be-protected bona fide purchaser.
This is a trend which should be curtailed immediately.
The author urges the California Supreme Court to reconsider
its position in Majewsky and overrule it when the opportunity pre-
sents itself. An alternative remedy would be a statutory amendment
to Section 853 of the California Civil Code explaining precisely
what type of intent, if any, is required before a resulting trust will
be imposed.
In any event, a Supreme Court reversal or a statutory amend-
ment is required in order to destroy the Mecca which has been
unjustly created for judgment creditors.
Raymond J. Davilla, Jr.


